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I. INTRODUCTION
An entity, such as a corporation, occasionally asks its lawyer to
investigate a particular matter. Often the investigation requires the law-
yer to interview employees, officers, directors, or other individuals
related to the entity. The individuals interviewed may be high-ranking
members of management if the matter the lawyer investigates relates to
a high-level matter, such as stock-option granting activities. The lawyer
may interview rank-and-file individuals who work on the loading dock if
the lawyer is investigating the existence of a drug-dealing ring on the
dock.
The lawyer, seeking to render the best possible representation to the
entity client, wishes to obtain complete and unfettered disclosure by the
individuals with whom the lawyer communicates. The more complete
the disclosure, the better counsel the lawyer can give to his or her client,
the entity.
The individual in this tripartite situation may be inclined to disclose
all to the lawyer because the individual does not truly understand where
the loyalties of the lawyer and the entity lie. The individual may view
the entity, the lawyer, and the individual as on the same team, just as
they are with regard to the typical day-to-day happenings involving the
entity. The individual may not understand that the attorney does not
view the individual as a client. The individual may not understand that
the attorney places the entity's interest well above that of the individual.
The individual may not realize that he or she has no right to block dis-
closure of his or her own communications with the attorney. The indi-
vidual may not realize that statements made to the attorney ultimately
might be used against the individual by the entity or other parties, such
as the government in a criminal prosecution.
The lawyer could eliminate any confusion of roles by clearly
explaining, in writing or otherwise, the situation to the individuals with
whom the lawyer talks.' A lawyer's explanation to the individual in the
tripartite situation has been referred to as a corporate Miranda warning
or an Upjohn warning.2 In fact, the rules of professional responsibility
1. See Brian Martin, Process Makes Perfect: Managing In-House Attorney-Client Privilege,
INSIDE COUNS., Mar. 2010, at 10, available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/March-
2010/Pages/Process-Makes-Perfect.aspx.
An essential component of the investigative process is the "Upjohn warning," which
clarifies to an employee being interviewed that the attorney is representing the
corporation and not the individual. Establishing this relationship at the outset
precludes the employees from reasonably asserting ownership of the privilege
relating to interactions with in-house counsel.
Id.
2. These warnings are sometimes called Upjohn warnings in honor of Upjohn Co. v. United
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governing lawyer conduct require the lawyer in the tripartite situation to
be honest and forthright.'
Yet, cases in which attorneys have been less than clear in their
explanations or in which the attorneys cannot prove that they gave any
clarification to the individuals with whom they dealt are anecdotal evi-
dence that attorneys are not rigorous in their explanation of the implica-
tions of the tripartite situation to the individuals with whom they
communicate.' The lawyer's desire to serve the entity client well by
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), in which the United States Supreme Court affirmed that an entity,
such as a corporation, can have an attorney-client privilege. In Upjohn, the Court clarified that the
corporation's privilege rightly could attach to communications between a lawyer and a variety of
constituents of the entity and was not simply limited to communications between a lawyer for the
entity and the control-group individuals. See also infra Section III.D. This recognition that the
corporation's lawyer could have communications with all sorts of individuals and the entity's
attorney-client privilege could protect those communications created an environment in which
individuals speak with entity counsel and may not understand the role of the attorney, the role of
the individual, and privilege rights of the entity and the individual. The Upjohn case did not deal
with warnings or explanations about the lawyer's role. It simply discussed the context in which
explanation or warnings for the individual might be needed. Thus, the clarification of roles is
sometimes called an Upjohn warning. See Lee G. Dunst & Daniel J. Chirlin, A Renewed Emphasis
on Upjohn Warnings, WHrrE-COLLAR CRIME ANDREWS LrrlG. REP. (Thomson Reuters, Danvers,
Mass.), Sept. 2009, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Dunst-
Chirlin-RenewedEmphasisOnUpjohnWarnings.pdf.
The clarification or explanation is sometimes called a corporate Miranda warning in honor of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). That case established that a person must be informed of
his or her constitutional rights before any custodial interrogation can occur. An interrogation
without informing the interrogated of constitutional rights violates the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination. An attorney's clarification in the entity context is, simply,
analogous, but not truly related, to the criminal context of the Miranda case.
There are many suggestions in the literature about what lawyers should say to clarify the
situation to the individual, especially in light of recent developments in the area. See, e.g., Ashish
S. Joshi, Corporate Miranda: Clarifying Lawyers' Loyalty During an Internal Investigation, Bus.
L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 51; Dunst & Chirlin, supra; Michael Li-Ming Wong & Asheesh
Goel, Beefing up "Corporate Miranda Warnings": Averting Misunderstandings & Detrimental
Consequences in Internal Investigations, WALL ST. LAW. (Thomson Reuters, Danvers, Mass.),
Aug. 2009, available at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/upload/ArticleWSJMirandaWarnings.
pdf; Robert J. Jossen & Neil A. Steiner, The "Upjohn" Pitfalls of Internal Investigations,
N.Y.L.J., July 13, 2009, at S4; Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, "Adnarim" Warnings in
Corporate Internal Investigations, N.Y.L.J., May 5, 2009, at 3.
Most recently, the White Collar Crime Committee of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section
established a Task Force to examine the issue of just what lawyers need to say. In July of 2009,
the Task Force issued a report with recommended best practices which provides a suggested
Upjohn warning along with recommended procedures. See Upjohn Warnings: Recommended Best
Practices when Corporate Counsel Interacts with Corporate Individuals, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM.
JusT., available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR301000/newsletterpubs/
ABAUpjohnTaskForceReport.pdf.
3. See infra Section VI.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (commenting
on the lack of explanation given even though the need for the explanation has been well known for
many years); see also United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009). In United States v.
Ruehle, the Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had found that the lawyers had not provided
any sort of Upjohn or Miranda warning to the individual. The Ninth Circuit refused to declare that
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obtaining complete disclosure perhaps explains this behavior. Unfortu-
nately, because attorneys want to provide the best possible representa-
tion to the entity clients, which pay their fees, and thus because these
attorneys want to obtain the fullest possible disclosure from the individ-
uals, these attorneys have the incentive to give weak explanations or no
explanation at all of the situation to the individuals, regardless what the
governing standards of professional conduct might suggest.'
Not infrequently in recent years, this tripartite relationship of entity,
attorney, and individual has come under scrutiny by the courts. The judi-
cial scrutiny does not arise from claims against attorneys for profes-
sional misconduct, however. Rather, the typical context bringing the
issue to the courts is that the entity waives any attorney-client privilege
right it has with regard to the communications between the lawyer and
the individual and discloses the content of the communications to an arm
of the government. Sometimes the entity does this to garner favor when
the government has targeted the entity for prosecutorial scrutiny. The
government then may seek to use the individual's communications with
the lawyer in the prosecution of the individual.
The individual typically attempts to block the use of his or her
communications with the lawyer by asserting that the communications
are privileged apart from the entity's privilege. There are several differ-
ent ways an individual can assert the attorney-client privilege in the tri-
partite situation. First, the individual might claim that he or she was a
client of the lawyer for purposes of the communications such that the
individual has the right on the basis of the attorney-client privilege to
block disclosure of the communications. The individual might claim that
the attorney represented him or her separately or jointly with the entity.
With a separate representation the privilege and the waiver right is the
individual's alone. The attorney simply has two clients with separate
attorney-client privilege rights. With a joint-client representation, the
entity and the individual share the privilege such that both must agree to
a waiver of it. Generally, the clients must share a common interest for a
court to recognize a joint-client privilege.6 The only exception to the
lower-court finding "clearly erroneous." Id. at 604 n.3. In fact, the district court stated than even if
the lawyers gave a warning, the warning described by the attorney was "woefully inadequate."
United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2009), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
5. See Dunst & Chirlin, supra note 2; Jossen & Steiner, supra note 2. One lawyer who
handles white-collar matters has said, "that particular tension is one of the most difficult things
that any in-house counsel can manage." See Steven Andersen, Full Disclosure: 9th Circuit
Restores Conventional Wisdom on Privilege, INSIDE CouNs., Dec. 2009, at 36, available at http://
www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2009/December-2009/Pages/Full-Disclosure.aspx.
6. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states:
(1) If two or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a
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dual-waiver requirement is that if the parties become adverse, one of the
joint clients can disclose and use communications against the other with-
out the other's consent.'
An individual in a tripartite situation might make a third type of
privilege claim. The individual might claim that a joint-defense or com-
munity-of-interest privilege protects the communications from disclo-
sure. With such a claim, the individual does not assert that the entity
attorney represented the individual. Rather, the claim is that the entity
and the individual shared a community of interest or joint defense such
that any communications between the parties or their lawyers enjoy a
privilege and are not disclosable unless all parties agree.'
communication of either co-client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under
§§ 68-72 and relates to matters of common interest is privileged as against third
persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by
the client who made the communication.
(2) Unless the co-clients have agreed otherwise, a communication described in
Subsection (1) is not privileged as between the co-clients in a subsequent adverse
proceeding between them.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000); see also Robert Bosch
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 263 F.R.D. 142, 145-46 (D. Del. 2009) (stating that in a joint-client
situation, a co-client "may unilaterally waive the privilege regarding its communications with the
joint attorney, but cannot unilaterally waive the privilege for the other joint clients or any
communications that related to those clients"); Teleglobe USA, Inc. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe
Commc'ns Corp.), 392 B.R. 561, 589 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 0 (noting that waiver by one joint
client is not sufficient without waiver by other client). See generally PAUL R. RICE, ArrORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 4:30-32 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2009).
7. Regarding joint-client privilege, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
states: "Unless the co-clients have agreed otherwise, a communication described in Subsection (1)
is not privileged as between the co-clients in a subsequent adverse proceeding between them."
§ 75(2); see also In re Blier Cedar Co., Inc., 10 B.R. 993, 1002 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981). See
generally RICE, supra note 6, § 4:33.
8. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states:
(1) If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated
matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information
concerning the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies
as privileged under §§ 68-72 that relates to the matter is privileged as against third
persons. Any such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the
client who made the communication.
(2) Unless the clients have agreed otherwise, a communication described in
Subsection (1) is not privileged as between clients described in Subsection (1) in a
subsequent adverse proceeding between them.
§76. See generally RICE, supra note 6, §§ 4:22, :35.
For an example of a claim of a joint-defense or community-of-interest privilege in a
corporate-tripartite setting, see United States v. Weissman, No. SI 94 CR. 760 CSH., 1996 WL
737042 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1996). In Weissman, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Empire
Blue Cross and Blue Shield claimed that Empire improperly disclosed protected communications
he had with Empire's counsel. The CFO did not claim an individual privilege. The court said it
would not have recognized one anyway because any privilege established as to conversations
between Weissman and counsel for the corporate entity could be waived at any time, but only by
the corporate entity. Id. at *13. The CFO claimed that the communications were privileged
because the CFO and the entity were a part of a joint-defense or a community-of-interest
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Courts often confuse the joint-defense or community-of-interest sit-
uation and the joint-client situation.' Any claim of attorney-client privi-
lege based on a claim that the attorney represented the individual
separately or jointly is centered on the relationship between the attorney
and the individual. In contrast, a claim of attorney-client privilege based
on a claim that the individual and the entity share a community of inter-
est or a joint defense is centered on the relationship between the individ-
ual and the entity.
This article focuses on claims by individuals that the attorneys not
only represented the entities but also the individuals as separate or joint
clients. This article leaves for another day an analysis of claims of a
community of interest or a joint defense.
Given the apparent client-interest-based incentive lawyers in the tri-
partite situation have to not explain the lawyer's role and the implica-
tions of that role to the individual, and given that the entity client
benefits from the lack of clarity at the expense of the individual, one
might expect courts dealing with an individual's privilege claim to look
upon the individual, rather than the entity, sympathetically. Interest-
ingly, the contrary has occurred.
Many courts have engaged in flawed analysis and narrow vision in
arrangement. Id. at *6; see also United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295, 296-97 (D. Mass.
1995) (rejecting a vice president's claims that an entity's in-house counsel represented him
personally, or in the alternative, that he had a joint-defense arrangement with the entity).
9. For example, in In re Grand Jury (00-2H), 211 F. Supp. 2d 555 (M.D. Pa. 2001), the
government sought testimony from a lawyer who had represented the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and the entity. There was no dispute that the attorney represented both the individual and
the entity. Id. at 558 ("Both the Government and Attorney acknowledge that Attorney represented
all parties in the Employee Litigation."). The entity waived its privilege, and the government
argued that the individual could not block disclosure. Id. at 557. The court disagreed, finding that
the CEO and corporation were part of a joint defense.
[The] CEO has not waived his privilege. Therefore, any confidential statements by
CEO, pertaining to the Employee Litigation, are privileged. CEO's statements to
Attorney are protected by CEO's individual attorney-client privilege. Just as CEO
cannot unilaterally prohibit Corporation from consenting to disclosure of its
confidential communications with counsel, Corporation cannot waive the privilege
belonging to CEO. If CEO made statements to Vice President, who then relayed
those statements to Attorney, those statements fall within the joint defense privilege.
Although the Third Circuit has not addressed the issue, the court agrees with
Attorney that Corporation cannot unilaterally waive the entire joint defense
privilege.
Id. at 559. In this situation, the corporation and the individual, the CEO, were really joint clients in
that both were represented by the same attorney. See also Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Benun (In
re Benun), 339 B.R. 115, 127 & n.12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006) (discussing confusion of joint client
and community of interests); 24 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5493 (1986) (noting the confusion between the joint-defense privilege
and the privilege for joint clients).
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denying privilege to the individual."o The courts have been eager to pro-
tect the entity's control over its attorney-client privilege at the expense
of any competing privilege of the individual. These courts have not
applied the traditional attorney-client privilege used in other settings.
Rather, these courts have added requirements when the question is
whether the privilege applies to communications of the individual and
attorney in the tripartite situation. For example, some courts have
refused to recognize the right of the individual to assert the protection of
the attorney-client privilege and thus have refused to recognize an indi-
vidual's right to control disclosure of his or her communication with the
attorney unless the communication involved matters unrelated to the
business or operations of the entity." In other settings, there is no simi-
lar requirement for application of the attorney-client privilege.12
In applying these additional requirements to the tripartite situation,
these courts have failed to give effect to the individual's honest and
reasonable belief in the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Such
a failure is a failure to apply a basic and accepted legal principle. Histor-
ically, whether the question has been malpractice liability, conflicts of
interest, or the application of the attorney-client privilege, the courts'
decisions have been guided by the honest and reasonable belief of the
person dealing with the lawyer.' If the person honestly and reasonably
believes that the attorney represents or may represent the individual in
the future, then there is an attorney-client relationship for purposes of
malpractice, conflicts of interest, and attorney-client privilege. Yet, in
the tripartite setting, the additional and exacting requirements for the
existence of an attorney-client relationship and recognition of a privilege
render the individual's honest and reasonable belief irrelevant. Thus, an
individual in the tripartite situation may honestly and reasonably believe
that the attorney for the entity also represents him or her. The individual
may honestly and reasonably believe that in talking with counsel, the
individual is consulting in confidence with the attorney for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. The individual may honestly and reasonably
not understand the implications of that lack of representation for pur-
poses of the privilege and disclosure of the statements of the individual.
Even so, the analysis of many courts yields a finding of no attorney-
client relationship and no privilege.
10. See infra Section V.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1997);
In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1986).
12. See infra Section III.
13. See, e.g., Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.
Del. 2009) (stating that the question for consideration is the reasonableness of the client's belief);
see also infra Section IV.
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These courts have ventured away from traditional doctrine by
requiring an individual in the tripartite situation to satisfy more and dif-
ferent requirements in order to enjoy the protection of the privilege.
These courts have ventured away from traditional doctrine in making
irrelevant the individual's honest and reasonable belief that the attorney
in the tripartite situation represented the individual. The courts appar-
ently have followed this approach in a misguided effort to protect the
entity's privilege rights, especially its waiver right, and to ensure narrow
application of the attorney-client privilege in general. The courts have
done so at the expense of the rights of the individual.
An added effect of the courts' treatment of claims of privilege by
individuals in the tripartite situation is that the approach in no way
encourages lawyers dealing with such individuals to clarify the situation
to the individuals. To the contrary, the courts' treatment creates a situa-
tion in which the lawyer may have added incentive to not clarify the
situation and perhaps even mislead the individual since the individual's
claim of privilege can rarely succeed. If there is little chance a court will
recognize that an individual has an attorney-client privilege with regard
to communications with the lawyer, the incentive for the lawyer in the
entity-tripartite situation is to allow the individual to misunderstand the
situation so that the individual discloses more fully to the lawyer than he
or she might do if the individual fully understands that the lawyer repre-
sents only the entity and that the individual has no control over disclo-
sure of the communications. The individual discovers the true story only
after the communications are a fait accompli. This approach is grossly
unfair to the individual. Even such an injustice might properly exist in
the law if an outweighing benefit can only be created with that cost. Yet,
in the tripartite situation, the entity's privilege rights can be protected
without such a cost.
An elegant and superior approach is to apply the traditional attor-
ney-client privilege in the traditional manner to an individual's claim of
a personal privilege in the tripartite situation. The individual should be
required to meet the same application requirements as any other privi-
lege claimant in any other context. In addition, the traditional approach
of honoring the claimant's honest and reasonable belief regarding the
existence of an attorney-client relationship should govern. No special
rules are needed.
In such an environment a lawyer can easily protect the entity's
privilege and waiver rights by being clear with the individual that the
attorney does not represent the individual and that the individual has no
control over disclosure of the communications. Then the individual can-
not infringe the entity's rights. A belief that the attorney in the tripartite
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situation represents the individual would be unreasonable. Importantly,
however, this approach does not needlessly trample the individual's
rights. Because the attorney clarifies the individual's position and rights
and the lawyer's role in the tripartite situation, the individual is not
affirmatively or negligently misled. This approach also encourages the
very conduct espoused by the standards of professional conduct for law-
yers.14 The individual is not misled or confused. There is no infringe-
ment of the rights of the entity. The lawyer conducts himself or herself
forthrightly and in a professionally responsible manner. There is fair-
ness for all. All interests are protected.
If the lawyer is not clear in explaining the situation to the individ-
ual, then it is fair to have not only the lawyer, but also the entity who
selected the lawyer, suffer the consequences of having a court determine
that the lawyer represented both the entity and the individual. If the law-
yer's representation of the individual means that the entity cannot alone
control the disclosure of the communications between the lawyer and the
individual, so be it. The lawyer's lack of clarification may have been
motivated by a desire to obtain the greatest disclosure from the individ-
ual so as to benefit the entity. Since the entity would benefit from the
obfuscation, intentional or otherwise, it is just that the entity suffer the
negative effects of the obfuscation as well."
Section II of this Article presents two recent examples of confusion
of roles when entity individuals deal with entity lawyers. Section III
discusses the traditional parameters of the attorney-client privilege. Sec-
tion IV explores the traditional approach for determining the existence
of a lawyer-client relationship. Section V examines the treatment the
tripartite situation has received in the courts when the question is privi-
lege. Section VI then examines the standards of professional responsibil-
ity governing lawyer conduct in the tripartite setting.
The Article concludes in Section VII that the application of the
attorney-client privilege to the situation of an individual communicating
with an entity lawyer requires no special legal standards, rules, or excep-
tions but rather the application of traditional principles applied tradition-
ally. Such a treatment should lead to a legally correct, professionally
responsible, and fair result for all.
II. RECENT SITUATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM
Several recent matters have brought the tripartite situation into the
14. See infra Section VI.
15. In United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court stated
that at least in cases of deception, it would be fair to have the entity client shoulder the burden of
the obfuscation.
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light of media coverage. An understanding of these widely publicized
situations can provide a basis for realistic analysis of the interests
involved and how various rules and holdings affect the interests of the
entity, the interests of the individual, the interests of the lawyer, and the
interests of the justice system. These situations illustrate what happens,
or does not happen, "in the real world."
A. The Broadcom Situation
1. THE FACTS
In the spring of 2006, Broadcom Corporation became concerned
that it had engaged in impermissible stock-option granting activities.16
Broadcom asked the law firm of Irell & Manella LLP to investigate
Broadcom's stock-option practices." At about the same time, a group of
shareholders filed a derivative suit against William Ruehle, Broadcom's
Chief Financial Officer, and several other Broadcom individuals. The
basis of the suit was that Ruehle and the others had engaged in improper
stock-option granting activities. In another suit, an amended complaint
was filed dealing with the same subject and named Ruehle as a defen-
dant." The lawyers' individual representation of Ruehle did not stand
out as unusual since Irell & Manella attorneys had represented Ruehle in
several other recently concluded lawsuits dealing with Ruehle's involve-
ment in Broadcom securities activities. 19
On June 1, 2006, the Irell & Manella lawyers met with Ruehle to
discuss stock-option granting activities at Broadcom.2 0 On June 13, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation of
Broadcom.2 1 In August of 2006, the Irell & Manella attorneys disclosed
the substance of Ruehle's June communications to Ernst & Young LLP,
Broadcom's auditors.2 2 The attorneys later disclosed the substance of
Ruehle's June 1 conversation with the lawyers to the SEC and to the
United States Attorney.23
Ruehle knew of the disclosure to Ernst & Young in 2006.24 He
learned of the disclosure to the government in 2008 when the govern-
16. Several published articles indicated that certain corporations had engaged in
impermissible stock-option granting activities. In May, an investor-rights group publicly identified
Broadcom as a company that had backdated stock options in contravention of laws and
regulations. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2009).
17. Id. at 603.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
20. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 604.
21. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
22. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 604.
23. Id. at 605.
24. Id. at 610.
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ment indicated that it intended to use the substance of Ruehle's June 1,
2006, conversation with the Irell & Manella lawyers in the criminal
prosecution of Ruehle. 25 Ruehle had been indicted on charges of con-
spiracy, securities and wire fraud, and other violations of Title 15 of the
United States Code.2 6 Ruehle asserted that his personal attorney-client
privilege protected his June 1 conversation with the Irell & Manella law-
yers. He asserted that the privilege belonged to him individually and that
he had not consented to the disclosure.27
2. THE DISTRICT COURT
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia agreed that the June 1 conversation was privileged and refused to
allow the government to use the communication. 28 The district court
determined that Ruehle was reasonable in believing that the Irell &
Manella attorneys represented him when the parties conversed on June
1.29 Irell & Manella lawyers represented Ruehle regarding two other
lawsuits at roughly the same time, and the court did not believe that the
lawyers clarified their role to Ruehle before the June 1 conversation. In
other words, the district court did not believe that the attorneys
explained to Ruehle that they did not represent him in that conversation,
though they represented him generally before and after. The Irell &
Manella attorneys presented no written evidence of such a disclosure.o
The district court noted that even if a warning was given as one of the
lawyers described, the warning was "woefully inadequate." 3 ' The law-
yer testified that he told Ruehle that the lawyers were speaking with him
on behalf of the entity, Broadcom, in connection with the investigation
of Broadcom's stock-option granting procedures. The lawyer testified
that the lawyers did not tell Ruehle that they did not represent him, did
not tell him that he should consult with another lawyer, and did not tell
him that his statements to them could be disclosed to third parties, such
as the government, and could be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. 32
25. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
26. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 605.
27. Id.
28. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
29. Id. at 1115 ("There is no serious question in this case that when Mr. Ruehle met with the
Irell lawyers on June 1, 2006, Mr. Ruehle reasonably believed that an attorney-client relationship
existed, he was communicating with his attorneys in the context of this relationship for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, and that any information he provided to Irell would remain
confidential.").
30. Id. at 1116-17.
31. Id. at 1117.
32. Id.
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In addition, the district court noted that even if the lawyers gave
Ruehle an oral warning, it was ineffective given that Ruehle was not
simply an individual who needed to be reminded that the lawyers did not
represent him. In fact, these lawyers represented Ruehle on other mat-
ters, the civil cases, and so an oral warning could not dissolve the rela-
tionship between the lawyers and Ruehle, the client, already in
existence; could not waive the conflict of the interview in light of the
representation; and thus could not waive the attorney-client privilege."
The district court determined that the attorney-client privilege applied.
The conversation was a communication between attorney and client for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice and was intended to be
confidential.34
Finally, the district court noted that the Irell & Manella attorneys
violated their duty of loyalty to Ruehle in three ways. First, the lawyers
did not disclose and obtain consent to the obvious conflict of interest in
which the lawyers labored in representing both Broadcom in the investi-
gation and Ruehle with regard to the two other related actions. Second,
the lawyers questioned Ruehle as part of the representation of
Broadcom.36 Lastly, the Irell & Manella attorneys disclosed Ruehle's
June 1 communications with third parties without his consent." The dis-
trict court stated that the court would report the lawyers to the discipline
authority of the California Bar.38
3. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The Ninth Circuit took a very different view of the situation on
interlocutory appeal. Recognizing that the district court found that the
Irell & Manella lawyers did not provide any sort of Upjohn warning, the
Ninth Circuit did not hold that finding to be "clearly erroneous."3 9 Like-
wise, the court of appeals accepted the lower-court determination that
Ruehle reasonably believed that the Irell & Manella lawyers represented
him in the June 1 conversation.4 0 The court noted that the Irell &
Manella attorneys also represented Broadcom in the June 1
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1116-17. The court rejected the government's argument that there was no
expectation of confidentiality since Mr. Ruehle knew that there would be a disclosure to the
auditors, Ernst & Young. The court stated, "This argument is unpersuasive. Mr. Ruehle never
understood that Irell might disclose statements adverse to Mr. Ruehle's interests to the
Government for use in a criminal case against him." Id. at 1116 n.6.
35. Id. at 1117-18.
36. Id. at 1119.
37. Id. at 1120.
38. Id. at 1121.
39. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009).




The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion,
however, that Ruehle had the right to prevent disclosure of his June 1
conversation with the lawyers. While not denying Ruehle the theoretical
right to control disclosure of his communication with the lawyers, the
Ninth Circuit determined that Ruehle did not prove that the situation met
the traditional definition for application of the attorney-client privi-
lege.4 2 In particular, Ruehle failed to prove that the communications he
had with the lawyers on June I were "made in confidence."4 3 Ruehle, as
the Chief Financial Officer, had been present at Broadcom meetings
before June 1 in which it was clear that the findings of the investigation
would be turned over to the outside auditors." In the view of the Ninth
Circuit, Ruehle could not "credibly claim ignorance of the general dis-
closure requirements imposed on a publicly traded company with
respect to its outside auditors or the need to truthfully report corporate
information to the SEC."45 Because Ruehle knew that his statements
would be shared with third parties such as Ernst & Young, the Ninth
Circuit refused to find Ruehle's communications with the lawyers
privileged.4 6
This Broadcom situation is helpful in illustrating the complexity of
the tripartite situation, even for sophisticated high-level entity represent-
atives and even for the lawyers involved. The situation is also helpful in
providing an example of lawyers' conduct in the tripartite situation in
terms of the kind of explanation lawyers provide to the individuals with
whom the lawyers communicate.
B. The Stanford Financial Group Situation
While not involving a specific claim of attorney-client privilege,
the recent Stanford Financial Group situation also illustrates the confu-
sion inherent in the tripartite relation of the entity, the entity attorney,
and the entity individual. The SEC charged that the Stanford Financial
Group had conducted a "massive fraud."4 7 Specifically, the SEC claimed
41. Id.
42. Id. at 609. The court of appeals noted the narrower test of privilege applied by some
courts to the tripartite situation but determined that it need not "decide the propriety of adopting
the specialized test" because it could resolve the matter using the less restrictive traditional
attorney-client privilege definition. Id. at 608 n.7.
43. Id. at 609 (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 610.
46. Id. at 612 ("His admitted awareness that anything relating to the former would not be held
in confidence but rather shared with at least one third party destroys the confidentiality essential to
establishing the privilege as to both.").
47. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Stanford GC's Resignation Offers Lessons, FULTON CouNrY
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that the Group made unrealistic promises of returns in selling $8 billion
in high-yield certificates of deposit."8
In February of 2009, in the midst of an investigation by the SEC,
Laura Pendergest-Holt, the Chief Investment Officer for the Stanford
Financial Group, was deposed. Thomas Sjoblom, outside counsel to the
Stanford Financial Group, attended the deposition with Pendergest-Holt.
A result of her deposition testimony, Pendergest-Holt later was arrested
and indicted for obstruction of the investigation.49 Pendergest-Holt sued
Sjoblom and his firm for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty,
claiming that Sjoblom and the firm led her to believe that they repre-
sented her at the deposition but then failed to fulfill the duties inherent in
the representation. In particular, Pendergest-Holt claimed that Sjoblom
never told her that he did not represent her, he never told her she could
refuse to appear before the SEC, he never told her about criminal penal-
ties related to sworn testimony before the SEC, he never told her about
her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, he never told her that her state-
ments to him were not privileged, he never told her that he could not
represent her because of the conflict of representing both her and the
entity, and he never told her that she should engage separate counsel.o
At the deposition Sjoblom stated in response to a question about whom
Sjoblom represented, "I represent the company Stanford Financial
Group and affiliated companies" and then stated regarding Pendergest-
Holt, "I represent her insofar as she is an Officer or director of one of the
Stanford affiliated companies.""
Pendergest-Holt's attorney on the malpractice claim stated that
even when Sjoblom stated during the testimony that he represented
Pendergest-Holt to the extent she was an officer of the company, "[s]he
didn't know what that meant." 52 Pendergest-Holt later moved to have
DAILY REP., Apr. 9, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=120
2429758491.
48. Id. (quoting the regional director of the SEC's Fort Worth Regional Office as stating that
"[w]e are alleging a fraud of shocking magnitude that has spread its tentacles throughout the
world"); see also Tom Fowler, Firm's Leader Was Warned, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2009, at TI,
available at 2009 WLNR 4766046; Julie Creswell & Clifford Krauss, Scandal's Small Sanctum,
N.Y. THmEs, Feb. 28, 2009, at Bl, available at 2009 WLNR 3900687.
49. See Lisa A. Cahill, Cases Highlight Minefield in Internal Investigations, N.Y.L.J., May
21, 2009, at 4, 9. Allegedly, she failed to reveal the extent of what she knew about the group's
investments. See Creswell & Krauss, supra note 48 (quoting Pendergest-Holt as stating in
response to SEC questions about a category of investments referred to as Tier III holdings that
"[i]f I knew anything about Tier III, I'd tell you ... God's honest truth").
50. See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 2, at 7; Mary Flood, Ex-Lawyer for Stanford Sued,
Hous. CHRON. Mar. 28, 2009, at 2, available at 2009 WLNR 5975472.
51. See Dunst & Chirlin, supra note 2, at 3; Cahill, supra note 49, at 9; Abramowitz &
Bohrer, supra note 2, at 7.
52. Ashby Jones, The Stanford Situation Heats Up: Pendergast-Holt Sues Sjoblom, WALL Sr.
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the matter dismissed without prejudice." Eventually the SEC filed a
civil suit against Pendergest-Holt and criminal indictments were issued
adding charges against Pendergest-Holt and others.5 4
As is true with the Broadcom case, this real-world situation and the
involvement of the lawyers and the individual bring to life the complex-
ity of the tripartite relationship and the confusion that easily can result.
III. THE TRADITIONAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Definition
The attorney-client privilege protects from compelled disclosure
communications between a client or prospective client or the client's
agents and an attorney or the attorney's agents. To be protected, the
communications must be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or
assistance. The client or prospective client must intend such communica-
tions to be confidential when making them. If a communication meets
this definition but is in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the privilege does
not protect the communication. If the client or prospective client waives
the privilege for a communication, the privilege no longer protects the
communication from compelled disclosure." Judge Wyzanski of the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.5 6 described the privilege in a
passage that has been much quoted over the years:
The privilege apples only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communica-
J.L. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2009, 9:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/03/31/the-stanford-situation-
heats-up-pendergast-holt-sues-sjoblom.
53. See Cahill, supra note 49, at 4.
54. See Mary Flood, Tom Fowler & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Seven Indicted in Stanford Ponzi
Case, Hous. CHRON., June 20, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 11939528; Mary Flood,
Indictment Delay OK with Stanford Figure, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2009, at B6, available at
2009 WLNR 5550146.
55. See RICE, supra note 6, § 2:1, at 6-10. Wigmore's treatise on evidence states that the
attorney-client privilege applies:
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997);
Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15,
1983), 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984); New Jersey v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 425 (D.
Kan. 2009); Jones v. Murphy, 256 F.R.D. 510, 512 (D. Md. 2008), aff'd, No. CCB-05-1287, 2009
WL 604937 (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2009); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795
(E.D. La. 2007). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§§ 68-86 (2000).
56. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
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tion was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opin-
ion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal pro-
ceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.57
The one claiming the privilege has the burden of proving that the privi-
lege applies."
The actual existence of an attorney-client relationship is not neces-
sary. The privilege applies in the situation of a prospective client con-
sulting with an attorney whom the prospective client honestly and
reasonably believes may eventually become the client's lawyer." The
privilege attaches even though no attorney-client relationship actually
develops as a result of or after the communication.6 0 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has explained this point as follows:
There is nothing anomalous about applying the privilege to such pre-
liminary consultations. Without it, people could not safely bring their
problems to lawyers unless the lawyers had already been retained.
"The rationale for this rule is compelling," because "no person could
ever safely consult an attorney for the first time with a view to his
employment if the privilege depended on the chance of whether the
attorney after hearing his statement of the facts decided to accept the
employment or decline it." 61
57. Id. at 358-59.
58. See Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations, Inc.), 502
F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412
F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 2005).
59. See Barton v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that website that said that no attorney-client relationship was created and might
never exist did not defeat claim of attorney-client privilege because the privilege attaches before
the attorney-client relationship exists). The court in Barton stated, "Prospective clients'
communications with a view to obtaining legal services are plainly covered by the attorney-client
privilege under California law, regardless of whether they have retained the lawyer, and regardless
of whether they ever retain the lawyer." Id. at 1111.
60. See Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 579-80 (D.S.D. 2006)
(holding that if a person seeks legal advice and reasonably believes the attorney represents the
person, the attorney-client privilege can apply even though no attorney-client relationship actually
exists or develops).
61. Barton, 410 F.3d at 1111 (quoting People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1995)); see
also Factory Mut. Ins. Co v. APComPower, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
("The Sixth Circuit recognizes that '[wihen a potential client consults with an attorney, the
consultation establishes a relationship akin to that of an attorney and existing client.' Attorneys are
bound by the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality in those circumstances."
(quoting Banner v. City of Flint, 99 F. App'x 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004))).
In addition, the privilege applies even if the person consulted as an attorney is in fact not one.
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B. The Rationale of the Privilege
The primary rationale for the privilege is utilitarian.6 2 By protecting
communications between attorneys and clients, the privilege encourages
clients to fully and completely disclose information. Only with this com-
plete information can attorneys render competent and proper legal assis-
tance and advice. The assumption is that clients will not be so open and
disclose so much and thus cannot obtain such assistance and advice
unless those clients are confident that the communications with attor-
neys will remain confidential." Long ago in Annesley v. Anglesea,6 4 an
English court stated:
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law,
without employment and consulting with an attorney; even if he is
capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he
does not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind,
which he apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he con-
sults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly
to serve him.65
Two hundred and thirty-eight years later, the United States
Supreme Court in Upjohn Company v. United States66 reiterated this
rationale and expanded upon it by noting that the attorney-client privi-
The privilege applies if the person consulting the lawyer honestly and reasonably believes the
person is a lawyer. See infra Section IV.D.2.
62. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:13, at
520 (3d ed. 2007); 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 387 (6th ed. 2006);
Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: An Argument for
Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1697, 1697 (1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).
63. See RICE, supra note 6, § 2:3, at 14-15; see also Bailey v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 179 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1970) (recognizing that this privilege is "of ancient origin. It is
premised on a recognition of the inherent right of every person to consult with legal counsel and
secure the benefit of his advice free from any fear of disclosure").
64. See RicE, supra note 6, § 1:3, at 12 n.20. For a discussion of the case, see Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061,
1073-80 (1978).
65. RICE, supra note 6, § 1:3, at 12 n.20; see also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888) (stating that the attorney-client privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure"); Phoenix Solutions Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
254 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
encourage 'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice."' (quoting
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981))); Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956
A.2d 937, 951 (Pa. 2008) ("The attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney
incompetent to testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free
flow of information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better
represent the client.").
66. 449 U.S. 383.
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lege encourages client candor, full disclosure, and frequent consultation
by the client with the attorney. This complete candor and consultation
means that attorneys can counsel clients as to how to conduct them-
selves within the bounds of the law. Ultimately, the administration of
justice improves."7
The utilitarian rationale of the privilege depends on the certainty of
the application of the attorney-client privilege. The privilege encourages
a client to communicate fully with his or her lawyer only to the extent
that the client can determine before the opportunity for disclosure that
the privilege will protect the communication from future disclosure. As
the Supreme Court has stated,
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of cer-
tainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.6
67. The Upjohn Court stated:
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and the administration of justice. The privilege recognizes
that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Id. at 389; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting full and frank communications
between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the
administration of justice."); Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470 ("The rule which places the seal of secrecy
upon communications between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest
and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 04-124-23 & 04-
124-05, 454 F.3d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to ensure
free and open communications between a client and his attorney.").
Deontological justifications, such as the notion that the client's privacy interest in the
communication justified the privilege or the notion that respect for the client's autonomy justifies
the privilege, are sometimes suggested. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's
Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 349,
350 (1981); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 112-13 (1956).
68. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393; see also Teleglobe USA Inc. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe
Commc'ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 360 (3d Cir. 2007) ("It is essential that parties be able to
determine in advance with a high degree of certainty whether communications will be protected
by the privilege."); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.
1994) ("If we intend to serve the interests of justice by encouraging consultation with counsel free
from the apprehension of disclosure, then courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are
predictable and certain. 'An uncertain privilege-or one which purports to be certain, but results
in widely varying applications by the courts-is little better than no privilege."' (quoting Von
Bulow v. Von Bulow (In re Von Bulow), 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987))); Hercules Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) ("Only if the client is assured that the
126 [Vol. 65:109
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C. Cost of the Privilege and Related Skepticism
The generally recognized cost of the privilege is that applying the
privilege in a particular situation may keep relevant evidence away from
the truth-finder.6 9 This cost probably is less than one might imagine
because the privilege protects communications between client and law-
yer, but does not protect the facts underlying the communications.70
Even with this downside, the attorney-client privilege has been an
accepted creature of the law for centuries." This acceptance indicates a
shared belief that the benefits of the privilege ultimately outweigh the
costs. 7 2 Yet, courts recognize and fear the obstruction of the truth that
the attorney-client privilege may cause. As a result, courts have "strictly
confined [the privilege] within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle." 73 As a United States District Court for
information he relays in confidence, when seeking legal advice, will be immune from discovery
will he be encouraged to disclose fully all relevant information to his attorney.").
69. See Better Gov't Bureau v. McGraw (In re Allen), 106 F.3d 582, 600 (4th Cir. 1997)
("Like all privileges, the attorney-client privilege 'interferes with the truth seeking mission of the
legal process,' and therefore is not 'favored.'" (quoting United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369,
1389 (4th Cir.1996))); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed because it
"obstructs the truth-finding process"); Siegler v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 2009)
(observing that the attorney-client privilege is an obstacle to truth-finding). The great thinker
Jeremy Bentham believed the cost of the privilege was too high. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK
supra note 62, §5:13, at 521 n.16.
70. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 ("[Plrotection of the privilege extends only to
communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is
an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you
say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge
merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney."
(quoting City of Philadelphia, Pa. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1962))); see also Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client
Confidences, 24 OHIo ST. L. J. 1, 9 (1963). But see Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 191, 228-31 (1989).
71. See Better Gov't Bureau, 106 F.3d at 600 ("The Supreme Court, however, has expressly
recognized that the attorney-client privilege enjoys a special position as 'the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law' and that the privilege
serves a salutary and important purpose: to 'encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice."' (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389)); see also Hazard, supra note
64, at 1061; Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REv. 487 (1928).
72. See Teleglobe USA Inc., 493 F.3d at 361 n.13 (stating that the privilege is not
"disfavored"); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 32 F.3d at 862 ("The privilege encourages the client to
reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation. As
the privilege serves the interests of justice, it is worthy of maximum legal protection.").
73. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979)
(internal quotations omitted); see also U.S. EEOC v. ABM Indus., Inc., 261 F.R.D. 503, 507 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) ("Still '[b]ecause the attorney-client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the factfinder, it is only applied when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of
encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to his or her attorney."' (quoting Clarke v. Am.
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the District of New Jersey recently stated:
While it is true that the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed
because it "obstructs the truth-finding process," the privilege is not
"disfavored." Courts should be cautious in their application of the
privilege mindful that "it protects only those disclosures necessary to
obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent
the privilege." In all instances, the facts underlying any given com-
munication remain discoverable. 74
Placing the burden on the claimer to prove the applicability of the privi-
lege also reflects a healthy skepticism of it.75
D. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Entities
The attorney-client privilege applies to entities, such as corpora-
tions, just as it applies to individuals. 76 This principle has long been
accepted by the courts. 7 Of course, an entity must speak and act through
its agents and so a frequently asked question is which communications
by which agents of the entity enjoy the privilege.
In Upjohn Co. v. United States," the Supreme Court reviewed a
situation involving an internal investigation by Upjohn. The corporation
sought to determine whether illegal bribes had been offered or paid by
agents of Upjohn. Lawyers acting at the behest of Upjohn interviewed a
variety of individuals." The government later sought access to those
communications. Upjohn claimed that its attorney-client privilege pro-
tected the communications from compelled disclosure.
Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992))); Siegler, 874 N.Y.S.2d at 537
(narrowly construing the attorney-client privilege).
74. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300, 305 (D.N.J. 2008)
(quoting, in order, Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 951 F.2d atl423; Teleglobe USA Inc., 493 F.3d at
361 n.3; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see also Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); Intervenor v. United States (In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas), 144 F.3d 653,
658 (10th Cir.) (stating that the privilege "is to be strictly construed"); Jones v. Murphy, 256
F.R.D. 510, 512 (D. Md. 2008) ("The privilege is 'not favored by the federal courts' because it
interferes with the truth seeking process and contravenes the right of citizens to evidence, and
should be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle."' (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984))).
75. See, e.g., Solidus Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations, Inc.),
502 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007); Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc.,
412 F.3d 215, 225-26 (1st Cir. 2005).
76. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391; see also La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys., 253 F.R.D. at 305
("It is axiomatic that the privilege extends to corporations."). See generally Grace M. Giesel, The
Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House
Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1169 (1997).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);
LaLance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1898).
78. 449 U.S. 383.
79. Id. at 387.
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that communica-
tions between Upjohn's counsel and any employee within the control
group of Upjohn were protected by Upjohn's privilege, assuming other
requirements of the privilege were satisfied. Communications between
Upjohn's counsel and other employees were not protected by Upjohn's
privilege.so An employee was considered to be within the control group
of Upjohn if the individual could control or would be involved in plan-
ning Upjohn's response to legal advice."'
The Supreme Court rejected the control-group analysis. The Court
concluded that the applicability of the entity's attorney-client privilege
did not depend on whether the communications involved individuals in
the control group of an entity for purposes of federal common law.8 2 The
Court stated:
In the corporate context, ... it will frequently be individuals beyond
the control group as defined by the court below ... who will possess
the information needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-
and indeed lower-level-individuals can, by actions within the scope
of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficul-
ties, and it is only natural that these individuals would have the rele-
vant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to
advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties."
The Court stated that applying the narrow control-group analysis hin-
dered the free flow of information to lawyers and thus thwarted the
rationale of the privilege.84 The Court explained that limiting the appli-
cation of the privilege to control-group agents of the entity "makes it
more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the individuals
who will put into effect the client corporation's policy."" The Court
ultimately held that Upjohn's privilege applied to the communications in
question, but the Court provided little guidance as to a specific analysis
to apply. The Court discussed a list of factors it considered in support of
its holding."
In response to the Upjohn opinion's rejection of the control-group
analysis for purposes of federal-privilege law, courts have adopted less
limiting tests for application of the attorney-client privilege for entities.
For example, some courts have adopted an analysis that protects as priv-
80. Id. at 388-89.
81. See generally Glen Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-
Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IoWA L. REv. 899, 908-11 (1980); Note, Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424 (1970).
82. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-91.
83. Id. at 391.
84. Id. at 392.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 394-96; see also RicE, supra note 6, § 4:14, at 4-67 (listing five factors).
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ileged any confidential communication between an employee and the
attorney for the corporation for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance
for the corporation. The entity's privilege applies if the communication
concerns matters that are within the scope of the responsibilities the
individual has as an employee." The Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, in section 73, proposes a test that focuses on
whether the communication "concerns a legal matter of interest to the
organization.""
If the nature of the individual's communication with the entity's
lawyer is such that a court would recognize the communication as a
privileged communication of the entity with its counsel, then the entity
has the right to assert or waive that privilege. The difficulty is that the
entity's attorney-client privilege may apply to a communication between
an employee and entity counsel, but that same individual may not have
the right to assert or waive the privilege on behalf of the entity.89 Only
those agents of the entity responsible for the policy and operation of the
entity may assert or waive the entity's privilege. 0 In other words, that
employee's communications create a privileged communication for the
87. See, e.g., Barton v. Zimmer Inc., No. 1:06-CV-208, 2008 WL 80647, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan.
7, 2008) ("This so-called 'subject-matter' test asks whether the communication was made at the
instance [sic] of the employee's superior and whether the subject matter of the communication,
upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and contained within the
communication, was within the scope of the individual's duties."); Nat'1 Tank Co. v. Brotherton,
851 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. 1993) (noting that the subject-matter test is met if "the employee
makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject
matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment"); see also
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) ("We conclude
that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently
identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the
corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties
of his employment."), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). See generally RICE, supra note 6, §§ 4:13-:14;
Bufkin Alyse King, Commentary, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REv. 621 (2002); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:
Alternatives to the Control Group Test, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 459 (1981).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(3) (2000).
89. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985)
("[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive
the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well."); see also RICE, supra note 6, § 4:20, at
4-113 ("Courts universally accept the notion that the corporate board of directors and the officers
to whom it delegates its management authority have both the right and the responsibility to either
assert or waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege claims for the benefit of the
corporation.").
90. See In re In-Store Adver. Sec. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Where the
client is a corporation, the power to 'invok[e] or waiv[e] a corporation's privileges is an incident
of control of the corporation."' (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4, 734 F. Supp.
1207, 1211 (E.D. Va.), affd in relevant part sub nom. United States v. Under Seal (In re Grand
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corporation, but that employee does not necessarily have control over
the assertion or waiver of the corporation's privilege.
The bottom line is that the entity's attorney-client privilege may
apply to communications with all sorts of individuals. Because such
communications are privileged, corporate counsel has incentive to talk
with individuals who might know about a particular issue; the communi-
cations actually take place. And, absent clarification by the attorney, the
individual, sophisticated or unsophisticated, may be confused as to his
or her control over the disclosure of those conversations. Such an indi-
vidual may believe that he or she has the ability to control the entity's
privilege with regard to the individual's own statements. Or, such an
individual may believe that the lawyer for the entity is also the individ-
ual's lawyer such that the individual has attorney-client privilege rights
apart from any rights of the entity.
IV. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. The Standard Generally
Though no attorney-client relationship is absolutely required for the
attorney-client privilege to apply,9 ' the recognition of an attorney-client
relationship is very helpful in attorney-client privilege analysis. The
privilege applies only to communications between an attorney and client
for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. The existence of
an attorney-client relationship makes the finding that the communication
was for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice more certain.
The honest and reasonable belief of the person in the position of the
client generally determines the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship in contexts other than the entity-tripartite setting.9 2 The courts look
Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4), 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990))); see also RICE, supra note 6, § 4:25,
at 4-144.
91. The privilege can apply when the person or entity in the client's position seeks
representation by the lawyer, but the relationship has not yet formed. See supra Section IRA; see
also Barton v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2005). In
addition, the privilege can apply even if the relationship never actually ripens into an attorney-
client relationship. See Pucket v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 579-80
(D.S.D. 2006).
92. See Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D. Del.
2009) ("Under Delaware law, where there is no express contract or formal retainer agreement
evidencing an attorney-client relationship, 'courts look at the contacts between the potential client
and its potential lawyer to determine whether it would have been reasonable for the "client" to
believe that the attorney was acting on its behalf as counsel.'" (quoting Benchmark Capital
Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. C.A. 19719-NC, 2002 WL 31057462, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3,
2002))); see also NLRB v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 312 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[I]t is well
settled that 'the relationship between attorney and client hinges on the client's intention to seek
legal advice and his belief that he is consulting an attorney.' Thus, to determine whether there is
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to all of the circumstances of the situation such as the existence of a
representation agreement, written or otherwise. The presence of an
agreement to represent and be represented is not necessary for a court to
find an attorney-client relationship.9 3 If there is an agreement, however,
courts are very likely to find an attorney-client relationship."4 Paying the
lawyer is an indication of an attorney-client relationship as well,
although a person may pay a lawyer for the representation of another
and thus have no attorney-client relationship with the lawyer. 9 5 State-
ments or other indications by the lawyer to the effect that the lawyer
represents a person or entity are also excellent evidence of an attorney-
client relationship. For example, if a lawyer gives the person or entity in
the position of the client legal advice or other legal assistance, a court
likely will find an attorney-client relationship. If a person makes state-
ments or otherwise signals that he or she believes the lawyer represents
him or her and the lawyer knows of these statements or other signals and
does not correct this belief, a court may very well recognize that the
person honestly and reasonably believes that the lawyer represents the
person. A lawyer's "failure to dispel [the putative client's] expectations"
is telling.96
The existence of a conflict of interest may be a factor arguing
an attorney-client relationship here, I must determine whether the Union 'believed [it] was seeking
advice and whether [the Union's] belief about the confidentiality of the conversation was
reasonable."' (quoting Jones v. United States, 828 A.2d 169, 175 (D.C. 2003))); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Kreamer, 946 A.2d 500, 521 (Md. 2008) ("Rather, '[t]he
relationship may arise by implication from a client's reasonable expectation of legal
representation and the attorney's failure to dispel those expectations."' (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (Md. 2003))); John V. Heutsche Co.
L.P.A. v. McNea, 15 Ohio Misc. 2d 23, 26 (Mun. Ct. 2008) ("Whether or not an attorney-client
relationship was created 'turns largely on the reasonable belief of the prospective client.')
(quoting Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Hardiman, 798 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ohio 2003))). See
generally Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship: Exploring the Unintended
Consequences of Inadvertent Formation, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 269 (2009).
93. See Tinn v. EMM Labs, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (D. Or. 2008) (recognizing that
no express written or oral contract is necessary); Smith v. State, 905 A.2d 315, 325-26 (Md. 2006)
(noting that no express agreement is necessary).
94. See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (noting that engagement agreement said law firm represented a corporation "and its
affiliates" and so the affiliate's claim of representation was reasonable); see also Johnson v.
Schultz, 671 S.E.2d 559, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) ("'[T]he relation of attorney and client may be
implied from the conduct of the parties, and is not dependent on the payment of a fee, nor upon
execution of a formal contract."' (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 325 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1985), af'd, 691 S.E.2d 701 (N.C. 2010))).
95. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.)
(stating that a professional relationship is not dependent on the payment of fees); Tinn, 556 F.
Supp. 2d at 1192 (stating that payment of fees is not necessary); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of
Md. v. Shoup, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (Md. 2009) ("Our cases make clear that an explicit agreement or
payment arrangement is not a prerequisite to the formation of an attorney-client relationship.").
96. Brooke, 821 A.2d at 425.
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against a putative client's reasonable belief of representation, but only if
it is a conflict that would be obviously problematic to the particular cli-
ent." The lawyer's belief as to the relationship is largely irrelevant."
The lawyer's actions are important only in that the person or entity in
the position of client bases the belief of a relationship on the lawyer's
actions.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section
14, is generally in agreement. Section 14 states:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reason-
ably relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the
services. 99
B. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in
the Conflicts Context
Often, the question of the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship arises in a conflict-of-interest scenario. A party moves to disqualify
counsel on the basis of a conflict of interest. The court then must deter-
mine whether the suspect counsel has or had an attorney-client relation-
ship with a party. If the court determines there is or was a relationship,
then the court may remove the attorney as counsel.
Sometimes the question is an easy one. In Avocent Redmond Cor-
poration v. Rose Electronics,'" a party claimed that the court must dis-
qualify opposing counsel because opposing counsel recently represented
it in a substantially related matter. In the earlier matter, an engagement
97. See Harry A. v. Duncan, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (D. Mont. 2004) ("'Where
appropriate, due consideration should be given to the unreasonableness of a claimed expectation
of entering into a co-client status when a significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists
between the organization or other client and the associated person or entity claimed to be a co-
client."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. f (2000))).
98. See Carnegie Cos., Inc. v. Summit Props., Inc., 918 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009) ("The law does not look to the reasonable expectations of the lawyer in order to determine
whether an attorney-client relationship has been established by implication."); see also In re
Conduct of Wittemyer, 980 P.2d 148, 153 (Or. 1999) (restating lawyer's argument that he and the
alleged client were really partners in the business transaction).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000); see MODEL
RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope at 17 (2009) ("[F]or purposes of determining the
lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules
determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists."); see also Minott, supra note 92.
100. 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
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agreement provided that lawyers of a law firm represented a corporation
"and its affiliates." 01 The party demanding the disqualification was an
affiliate of the corporation.' 0 2 The court held that the lawyers of the law
firm were in an attorney-client relationship with the affiliate. The court
stated: "The existence of the relationship "'turns largely on the client's
subjective belief that it exists." The client's subjective belief, however,
does not control the issue unless it is reasonably formed based on the
attending circumstances, including the attorney's words or actions.' "103
Frequently, the existence of the relationship is cloudier. In West-
inghouse Electric Corporation v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,'O4 the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals faced an intricate situation. Lawyers in a
firm represented Westinghouse in an antitrust action against several ura-
nium suppliers.' In addition, the very same law firm represented a
trade group of which the uranium suppliers were members. The law firm
contacted the supplier members in an effort to prepare a report about the
effect on them if certain legislation were enacted. 106 The resulting report
was released on the day the antitrust matter was filed.o' The uranium
suppliers then asked the court to disqualify the law firm from represent-
ing Westinghouse in the antitrust matter. 08 The court noted that the
attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and that therefore it is
not completely a creature of contract'0 9 or agency.110 The attorney-client
relationship "does not arise only in the agency manner such as when the
parties expressly or impliedly consent to its formation.""' The court
noted that the uranium suppliers did not request that the law firm act as
its lawyer, the law firm did not accept such employment orally or in
writing, and the suppliers did not pay the firm.1 2 Yet, the court stated,
"[a] fiduciary relationship may result because of the nature of the work
performed and the circumstances under which confidential information
is divulged."1 1
The court determined that each of the companies "entertained a rea-
sonable belief that it was submitting confidential information regarding
101. Id. at 1006.
102. Id. at 1002-03.
103. Id. at 1003-04 (quoting Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. 1992)).
104. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
105. Id. at 1313.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1314.
108. Id. at 1313.
109. Id. at 1317.
110. Id. at 1316-17.
Ill. Id. at 1317.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1320.
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its involvement in the uranium industry to a law firm which had solic-
ited the information upon a representation that the firm was acting in the
undivided interest of each company."" 4 The court refused to allow the
law firm to oppose the members of the trade group who were also
defendants in the antitrust matter.115
In Montgomery Academy v. Kohn," 6 the District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey faced a claim of disqualification in the context of an
entity-tripartite situation. An attorney discussed with an employee the
possibility of representing the entity, but the individual understood that
the Board of Directors would have to approve the official hiring of the
attorney. The employee confided in the attorney. The employee dis-
cussed personal matters, such as the employee's personal investments,
insurance coverage, and such."' The lawyer had represented the indi-
vidual individually in the past in other matters. The court approved a
finding that the individual "reasonably considered [the lawyer] to be her
personal lawyer and thought that [the lawyer] would protect her inter-
ests." 1 8 The court then approved the magistrate judge's disqualification
of the lawyer.1 19
C. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in
the Malpractice Context
Another setting in which the question of the existence of an attor-
ney-client relationship often arises is an action for malpractice. Absent
an attorney-client relationship, a lawyer owes no duty of care to the per-
son or entity. The existence of the relationship is a necessary first step to
the success of any malpractice claim. For example, in Mansur v.
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. ,120 a Florida appellate court held that the lower
114. Id. at 1321.
115. Id. at 1322.
116. 82 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.N.J. 1999).
117. Id. at 315.
118. Id. at 314.
119. Id. at 315 (noting that the lawyer testified that the lawyer told the individual that the
lawyer could not represent both the individual and the employer but the magistrate judge did not
believe the testimony.).
In Cody v. Cody, 889 A.2d 733 (Vt. 2005), a son moved to disqualify a law firm from
representing his parents and a corporation in an action against him. The lower court granted the
motion to disqualify. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Vermont disagreed. The supreme
court noted that the lower court "employed an appropriate test" by evaluating "the objective
reasonableness" of the son's belief regarding the representation. Id. at 739. Yet, the court
disagreed that the evidence necessarily supported a finding that the son's belief that the firm
represented him was reasonable. Id. at 740. The court then ordered the lower court to hold an
evidentiary hearing so that all relevant evidence could be considered in determining the existence
of an attorney-client relationship. Id.
120. 994 So. 2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the law
firm because there was some evidence that the firm's statements and
actions led the alleged clients, who were brothers, to believe that the
lawyers of the firm represented all of the brothers as opposed to only
one of them.12 ' The firm had sent a letter to a third party stating the
desires of all of the brothers. The firm had filed a motion on behalf of
one brother but stated that the brother acted on behalf of the other broth-
ers. 122 The firm had sent the brothers communications that were at best
ambiguous but appeared to render legal advice." Also, the firm had
sent a letter to a third party referring "to the four Mansur brothers we
represent."1 24
D. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in
the Attorney-Client Privilege Context
In the context of applying the attorney-client privilege, courts have
used the concept of honoring the honest and reasonable belief of the
person or entity in the position of a client in several different ways. 125
For example, courts have used an honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis
to answer the question of whether the person and the lawyer were in an
attorney-client relationship. The courts have used this analysis as a step-
ping stone to determining whether the person consulted the lawyer for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance such that the attor-
ney-client privilege applied to the communication. Courts have also used
the honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis to determine whether the priv-
ilege should apply when the person in the position of lawyer is not, in
fact, a lawyer. Also, courts have used the honest-and-reasonable-belief
analysis to determine whether the privilege should apply when the com-
munication is not, in fact, confidential.
121. Id. at 439; see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. GAB Robins N. Am., Inc., 999 So.
2d 72, 78 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that correspondence specifically limited the representation
to one suit and not others so belief of representation on other matters was not reasonable and so no
malpractice action was possible).
122. Mansur, 994 So. 2d. at 436.
123. Id. at 437.
124. Id. at 438.
125. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 923 (8th Cir. 1997). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
In some aspects of the law of attorney-client privilege, the client's reasonable
beliefs may be relevant. For example, courts have found the privilege applicable
where the client reasonably believed that a poseur was in fact a lawyer, reasonably
believed that a lawyer represented the client rather than another party, or reasonably
believed that a conversation with a lawyer was confidential, in the sense that its
substance would not be overheard by or reported to anyone else. All these situations
involve, in essence, reasonable mistakes of fact ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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To use the honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis in these ways is
consistent with the utilitarian rationale of the privilege. Yet, such use
results in a more expansive application of the privilege. Honoring the
client's or prospective client's honest and reasonable belief about a situ-
ation supports the privilege's rationale because the belief of the person
or entity in the position of client determines that person's or entity's
willingness to disclose to the lawyer. In other words, if the putative cli-
ent believes the privilege protects a communication, then the client will
more willingly provide a full disclosure to the attorney. The occurrence
of this complete disclosure is the primary rationale of the privilege
itself.126
1. REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE LAWYER REPRESENTS
THE PERSON OR ENTITY
Perhaps the most complex and detailed treatment of the honest-and-
reasonable-belief analysis of whether a lawyer represents the person or
entity in an attorney-client privilege setting is Sky Valley Limited Part-
nership v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd.127 In Sky Valley, a group of entities and
individuals comprising the plaintiffs had been represented by a certain
law firm.'28 The defendants in the litigation, also a group of entities and
individuals, claimed that the same law firm had represented them as well
as the plaintiffs. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs and the
defendants had been joint clients of the law firm.1 29 Rather than the
more commonly used joint-client privilege to block disclosure of com-
munications, the defendants sought to use the claim of joint-client privi-
lege to require disclosure.13 0
When parties sharing a joint-client privilege become adverse, there
is no privilege between the former joint clients.131 The Sky Valley court
referred to this disclosure right as the "'joint client' exception."132 The
joint-client privilege shares the same basic rationale as the privilege in
general. It encourages full communication between joint clients and the
lawyer so the clients can obtain the best possible advice.133 In contrast,
the rationale of the joint-client exception, which leads to disclosure, is
(1) to prevent unjustifiable inequality in access to information neces-
126. See supra Section III.B.
127. 150 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
128. Id. at 650.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 651.
131. See supra text at note 6; see also RESTATEMENT (THIn) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 75(2) (2000); RICE, supra note 6, § 4:33.
132. Sky Valley, 150 F.R.D. at 651
133. Id. at 653.
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sary to resolve fairly disputes that arise between parties who were in
the past joint clients-when the disputes relate to matters that were
involved in the joint representation and (2) to discourage abuses of
fiduciary obligations and to encourage parties to honor any legal
duties they had to share information related to common interests. 134
In order to determine whether the joint-client exception applied, the
court first had to determine whether the lawyers in the firm and the
defendants were in an attorney-client relationship. The court then had to
determine whether the defendants and the plaintiffs were joint clients of
the lawyers in the firm.
In performing this analysis, the court stated that "the courts have
focused on whether it would have been reasonable, taking into account
all the relevant circumstances, for the person who attempted to invoke
the joint client exception to have inferred that she was in fact a 'client'
of the lawyer."' 35 The court continued that
resolution of the dispute will turn on whether a contractual relation-
ship was formed implicitly. To answer that question, courts necessa-
rily look to circumstantial evidence, taking into account all kinds of
indirect evidence and contextual considerations that appear relevant
to determining whether it would have been reasonable for the person
to have inferred that she was the client of the lawyer. Thus, in this
setting, whether the attorney-client relationship existed is a question
of law that is resolved through an objective test. 13 6
The Sky Valley court then listed a plethora of factors to consider in
determining whether a party's belief in a representational relationship,
and a joint representation in particular, was reasonable. The court noted
that the analysis might be different in other contexts but that this was the
proper analysis when evaluating whether to apply the joint-client excep-
tion and thus force a disclosure.13 1
134. Id.; see also Glacier Gen. Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 435, 436 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979).
135. Sky Valley, 150 F.R.D. at 651; see also Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 756, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
136. Sky Valley, 150 F.R.D. at 652.
137. The court noted:
There are a great many factors that the courts should take into account when
deciding whether an implied contractual relationship exists for purposes of the joint
client exception. These pertinent circumstances generally will include: the conduct
of the party and counsel, what the party and counsel communicated to one another
(both about their relationship and about other things, taking special note of any
communications from the party to counsel that courts would not expect the party to
have made if it had not considered itself to be a joint client of the lawyer), what
drove the party to communicate with the lawyer and the lawyer to communicate
with the party (considering especially whether the party was obligated to
communicate what it did to the lawyer or was free to decide whether or not to make
the communications to the lawyer), the capacity in which the party communicated
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The court accepted that the defendants believed that the lawyers of
the firm represented them. The court, however, found such beliefs
"clearly unreasonable."l 38 Thus, the defendants were not clients of the
lawyers of the firm, were not joint clients of the firm, and therefore,
could not compel disclosure via the joint-client exception.13 9
with the lawyer and the capacity in which the lawyer communicated with the party,
whether (with respect to matters on which the party and the lawyer communicated)
the party played a decision-making role comparable to the role that the law
empowers clients to play, whether the party was free to ignore the lawyer's advice
or was bound to act in conformity with directives from the lawyer, whether the party
paid or was obligated to pay the lawyer for her services, the relative sophistication
of the party and the magnitude or significance of the interests of the party that were
implicated in the matters covered by the alleged attorney-client relationship (the
more sophisticated the party, and the more significant the interests affected, the
more skeptically courts should view arguments that it was reasonable to rely on an
implied attorney-client contract), and whether and to what extent the party also
consulted or had access to any other lawyers during the relevant time period and
with respect to the subject matter as to which that party is seeking to invoke the
joint client exception.
Moreover, since the ultimate question is whether the law will deem two (or
more) parties to have been "joint clients" of a particular lawyer, it also is necessary
(in conducting this inquiry into all the relevant circumstances) to analyze all
pertinent aspects of the relationship and dynamics between (a) the party that claims
to have been a joint client and (b) the party that clearly was a client of the lawyer in
question. This analysis should include (but not necessarily be limited to) (1) the
conduct of the two parties toward one another, (2) the terms of any contractual
relationship (express or implied) that the two parties may have had, (3) any
fiduciary or other special obligations that existed between them, (4) the
communications between the two parties (directly or indirectly), (5) whether, to
what extent, and with respect to which matters there was separate, private
communication between either of them and the lawyer as to whom a "joint"
relationship allegedly existed, (6) if there was any such separate, private
communication between either party and the alleged joint counsel, whether the other
party knew about it, and, if so, whether that party objected or sought to learn the
content of the private communication, (7) the nature and legitimacy of each party's
expectations about its ability to access communications between the other party and
the allegedly joint counsel, (8) whether, to what extent, and with respect to which
matters either or both of the alleged joint clients communicated privately with other
lawyers, (9) the extent and character of any interests the two alleged joint parties
may have had in common, and the relationship between common interests and
communications with the alleged joint counsel, (10) actual and potential conflicts of
interest between the two parties, especially as they might relate to matters with
respect to which there appeared to be some commonality of interest between the
parties, and (11) if disputes arose with third parties that related to matters the two
parties had in common, whether the alleged joint counsel represented both parties
with respect to those disputes or whether the two parties were separately
represented.
Id. at 652-53.
138. Id. at 654.
139. Id. In support of its finding that the defendants' belief of representation was unreasonable,
the court noted that the lawyers subjectively did not consider the defendants to be clients and
never told anyone the firm represented the defendants. The lawyers told several people, including
representatives of the defendants, that the firm did not represent the defendants. The defendants
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2. REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE PERSON CONSULTED IS A LAWYER
a. case law
In addition to applying the honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis in
the attorney-client privilege setting to the question of representational
relationship, courts have also applied the analysis when the person con-
sulted is not, in fact, a lawyer. The courts addressing this issue have
stated that the privilege applies to a communication even if the person
consulted is not admitted to any bar and has enjoyed no legal training. If
the putative client honestly and reasonably believes that the person con-
sulted is a lawyer, and if the other requirements of the privilege are
satisfied, the privilege applies even though the person consulted is, in
fact, not a lawyer.140
never paid the firn for services, and the firm never billed the defendants for services. The
defendants received letters from the firm identifying the plaintiffs as clients but not identifying the
defendants as clients. Id. at 654-55. The court found that the defendants sought legal advice from
the law firm and received legal advice from the law firm but only in the defendants' contractual
role as project manager, not individually. The project contract required that the project manager
consult with that law firm. Id. at 656. During the project the defendants also consulted a separate
lawyer about project matters. Id. at 657. The court concluded that "it would not advance the
purposes of the privilege to hold that there was an attorney-client relationship between [the
defendants] and [the law firm]" but might discourage communication by a party such as the
plaintiffs. Id. at 659.
In concluding that the defendant's belief that the defendants and the plaintiffs were joint
clients was unreasonable, the court noted that the parties were not equals with regard to the project
and the flow of information about it and were aware that they were not equals. The plaintiffs and
defendants also were not fiduciaries to each other and were not insurers or former clients. So even
though the parties had "economically significant commonalities of interest," the court stated that
such could not be "legally sufficient to invoke the joint client exception to the attorney-client
privilege." Id. at 659-61. In applying the joint-client exception, the court stated that
courts also should take into account the history of the relationship between the
parties, the extent and character of any tensions in their relationship or of any
asymmetry in their interests, and the likelihood and foreseeability of conflicts
arising between the parties in the future. We hasten to acknowledge that the
existence of some asymmetry of interests and/or the possibility of future disputes by
no means foreclose the possibility that the joint client exception applies.
Id. at 661-62.
140. See United States v. Rivera, 837 F. Supp. 565, 567 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("It is common
ground among the parties that the attorney-client privilege attaches to confidential
communications made to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief that he is an attorney.
Accordingly, it is irrelevant for the purposes of this motion that Rivera was not an attorney, since
the parties agree that his clients were operating under the mistaken belief that he was.") (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Tyler, 745 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that
the privilege applied if a person reasonably believed that his cellmate was a lawyer); United States
v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981) (stating that the privilege applied if the person
reasonably believed the one consulted was a lawyer).
In Dabney v. Investment Corp. of America, 82 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1979), the court
acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege could apply if "the client is genuinely mistaken as
to the attorney's credentials." The corporate client in Dabney was not "genuinely mistaken"
because at the time of the communication the client knew that the person was at first a law student
and then a law graduate who had not been admitted to any bar. Id.
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In United States v. Boffa,14 1 the defendants in a criminal matter
claimed that they had communicated with a person believing him to be a
lawyer, and thus the defendants claimed that the attorney-client privilege
protected those communications. The court stated:
[T]he rationale behind the privilege equally supports the theory that
the privilege should be extended to those who make confidential
communications to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief
that he is an attorney. Prudence dictates that such a belief should be
reasonable in order to lay claim to the protections of the privilege and
that a "respectable degree of precaution" in engaging the services of
the "attorney" must be demonstrated. Where such a belief is proved,
however, the client should not be compelled to bear the risk of his
"attorney's" deception and he should be entitled to the benefits of the
privilege as long as his bona fide belief in his counsel's status is
In United States v. Mullen & Co., 776 F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass 1991), the court faced a claim
of privilege with regard to communications with accountants. The court stated: "[T]he attorney-
client privilege may apply to confidential communications made to an accountant when the client
is under the mistaken, but reasonable, belief that the professional from whom legal advice is
sought is in fact an attorney." Id. at 621 (citing Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 523).The Mullen court then
noted that the record was devoid of any proof supporting such a reasonable belief. The court
ordered that such proof be produced if available so a correct decision on the matter could be
rendered. Id. at 622.
In Financial Technologies International, Inc. v. Smith, No. 99 CIV 9351 GEL RLE, 2000
WL 1855131 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2000), the court faced a claim that the privilege should apply to
communications between a corporate client and a person who was not a lawyer but whom the
client honestly thought was a lawyer and had employed as in-house counsel. The court stated:
On balance, the Court finds these sources compelling and is of the opinion that an
individual who reasonably believed that the person consulted was a duly admitted
attorney should be afforded a measure of protection. The alternative would require
individuals to check the background of a prospective attorney to insure that they
were confiding with a "real" attorney. The inherent delay in such a process might
well deprive the person of effective counsel at a time when advice is most valuable.
Id. at *6. Having said that, the court refused to extend such an approach to the corporate claimant
before it. The court took the position that a corporation or other entity, in employing in-house
counsel, must at the least investigate the background of the individual to confirm the individual's
status as a lawyer. Id. at *6-7. See also NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 129 n.23
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[S]ince NXIVM is a corporation it should have made sure O'Hara was
properly licensed."). See generally RICE, supra note 6, § 3:13, at 51. Wigmore also was of this
view:
The theory of the privilege clearly requires that the client's bona fide belief in the
status of his adviser as an admitted attorney should entitle him to the privilege. No
doubt an intention to employ only such a person is necessary, as well as a
respectable degree of precaution in seeking one. But from that point onward he is
entitled to peace of mind, and need not take the risk of deception or of the defective
professional title.
WIGMORE, supra note 55, § 2302, at 584.
The same is true regarding the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See Speaker ex rel. Speaker
v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that such
privilege can apply if the patient reasonably believes the person is a psychotherapist).
141. 513 F. Supp. at 517.
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maintained.142
Unfortunately, the court did not find that the defendants honestly and
reasonably believed the person to be an attorney."'
The court in United States v. Tyler applied the honest-and-rea-
sonable-belief analysis, but unlike the court in Boffa, the court deter-
mined that the privilege protected the communications. In Tyler, a
criminal defendant claimed that his conversations with his cellmate, who
was not a lawyer, should not be admissible. The defendant testified that
he honestly and reasonably believed that his cellmate was a lawyer. To
support his claim the defendant noted that a law-school diploma, among
others, hung on the cellmate's wall. The inmate population referred to
the cellmate as "counselor."1 45 Also, the cellmate assisted other prison-
ers on all types of legal matters. 146 Finally, the defendant paid the
cellmate for assistance on a parole-board matter.14 7
In an effort to defeat the defendant's privilege claim by defeating
the defendant's claim that he honestly and reasonably believed the
cellmate was a lawyer, the government pointed out that the law school
the cellmate claimed to have attended did not exist at the time he
claimed to have attended it and that the defendant knew the cellmate had
committed a felony.'
The court found that the defendant had an honest and reasonable
belief at the time of the communications that the cellmate was a lawyer.
The attorney-client privilege applied and protected the communications
from compelled disclosure.14 9
b. other law
Some jurisdictions define the attorney-client privilege by rule and
more precisely address the issue of the status of the person.150 For exam-
ple, several states have rules that specifically define "lawyer" as "a per-
son authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
142. Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 524-26. The court so concluded because of the unusual compensation arrangement,
the facts surrounding the person's employment, and activities in which the person was involved,
all of which were known to the defendants.
144. 745 F. Supp. at 423.
145. Id. at 424.
146. Id. at 425.
147. Id. at 424.
148. Id. at 424-25. The government argued that if the defendant knew the cellmate committed
a felony, he must have known that the cellmate was not a lawyer in good standing because no
jurisdiction allows felons to practice law. The court disagreed, stating: "To expect a layperson to
be familiar with the internal discipline procedures of the Bar is unreasonable." Id. at 425-26.
149. Id. at 426.
150. See, e.g., ALAsKA R. Evio. 503(b); CAL.. Evio. CODE § 950 law revision commission
cmts.; Ky. R. Evw. 503 (b); ME. R. Evm. 502(b); Tax. R. EviD. 503(b).
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engage in the practice of law in any state or nation."'"' Many of these
states have been influenced by the language a proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence, Rule 503,152 which was proposed but rejected by Congress in
the 1970s.15 3
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section
72, also has adopted this stance. Section 72 states that the privilege
applies when the communication involves a person "who is a lawyer or
who the client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a
lawyer."1 54
3. REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE COMMUNICATION IS CONFIDENTIAL
Another situation in which courts have used an honest-and-reasona-
ble-belief analysis in the context of the attorney-client privilege is on the
issue of confidentiality. Courts find communications confidential for
purposes of the privilege if the client honestly and reasonably believes
that the communications are confidential.15 5
For example, in Griffith ex rel. Smith v. Davis,15 6 the court evalu-
ated a claim of privilege by a former government employee. The
employee had been involved in a shooting within the scope of his
employment. As a result of the shooting, the employee met with repre-
sentatives of the government and his attorneys. The agent was told that
any information he conveyed to the representatives of the government
would be revealed only to authorized government individuals.' 5 7 The
employee later claimed that the privilege applied to the conversation
with the government representatives because these representatives later
became agents of government counsel and thus were within the circle of
privilege for those sharing a "common interest" privilege.' The Griffith
151. See, e.g., Ky. R. Evi. 503(a)(3); TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(3).
152. For the text of the proposed rule, see Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183, 235-40 (1973).
153. See generally Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000)
(discussing the approval and disapproval of the proposed rules).
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72(1) (2000).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); Griffith v. Davis, 161
F.R.D. 687, 694 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See generally RICE, supra note 6, § 6.1, at 7-9 ("The client's
subjective intention of confidentiality must be reasonable under the circumstances.").
156. 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
157. Id. at 690-91.
158. Id. at 691-92. Some courts refer to a joint-defense or community-of-interest privilege as a
"common interest privilege." If the person to whom the IRS agent was speaking was a
representative of a party or person with whom the IRS agent had a common interest, then the
attorney-client privilege could apply to the communications, assuming the situation satisfied the
confidentiality requirement of the privilege. See supra text at note 8 (discussing the joint-defense
or community-of-interest privilege).
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court agreed "that whether or not a given communication is 'confiden-
tial' within the meaning of the privilege is determined from the perspec-
tive of the client"' 5 9 but noted that "[t]he client's expectation of
confidentiality, however, must be reasonable."l 6 0 Because the former
employee knew at the time of the communication that the communica-
tion would be shared with third parties, the court determined that the
employee could not have had a reasonable belief that the statements
would remain confidential.1 6 1
Similarly, in United States v. Ruehle,16 2 the Broadcom matter,'
the court held that the privilege did not apply to Ruehle's communica-
tions with attorneys he thought represented him. The court did not deny
the privilege on the basis of a lack of representation, however. Rather,
the court determined that Ruehle did not establish that he had an honest
and reasonable belief that the communications were confidential.164 The
court noted, in particular, that Ruehle, the Chief Financial Officer,
understood before the conversation with the attorneys that the informa-
tion uncovered by the attorneys would be disclosed to the independent
auditors of Broadcom. 1 6 5 Ruehle also knew that "Broadcom intended to
fully cooperate with the SEC and the auditors." 16 6
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers agrees
that an honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis is appropriate on the issue
of confidentiality. In section 71 the Restatement provides:
A communication is in confidence with the meaning of [the privilege]
if, at the time and in the circumstances of the communication, the
communicating person reasonably believes that no one will learn the
contents of the communication except a privileged person . . . or
another person with whom communications are protected under a
similar privilege.' 6 1
159. Grffith, 161 F.R.D. at 694.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 696. See United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 1991), in which the
court evaluated an argument that the privilege did not apply because the conversation between the
attorney and clients took place with a third party present. The court stated that the privilege
applied because the clients intended the conversations to be confidential. Id. at 752. One of the
clients had "expressed concern" about the effect of the presence of the third party and had been
told that he was a part of the representation team. Id. at 752 n. 14. See also United States v. Bay
State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that a client's
reasonable belief is the "key question").
162. 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
163. See supra discussion Section H.
164. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 609 ("The notion that Ruehle spoke with [the attorneys] with the
reasonable belief that his statements were confidential is unsupported by the record.").
165. Id.
166. Id. at 610.




V. AN ANALYSIS OF COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE TRIPARTITE SITUATION
When confronted with a claim of privilege by an individual in the
typical tripartite-entity situation, many courts have not applied the attor-
ney-client privilege as it has been traditionally defined and have not fol-
lowed the precedent of using an honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis to
determine the nature of the relationship between the individual and the
lawyer. As the court in United States v. Stein stated in 2006 about the
treatment of an individual's claim of privilege in an entity-tripartite situ-
ation, "Courts have wrestled with this problem for some time now."16 1
Unfortunately, much of the precedent that is the result of the wrestling
match is flawed. Many courts facing such a scenario have taken a harsh
approach to an individual's claim that the corporation's lawyer also rep-
resents the individual. These courts reach the result of denying the indi-
vidual's claim of privilege by applying tests for application of the
privilege that are more demanding than those used in other sorts of
cases. In addition, the analyses used by these courts are not in accor-
dance with the general law regarding the recognition of an attorney-cli-
ent relationship.
A. The Bevill Case
A particularly influential case in this regard is In re Bevill, Bresler
& Schulman Asset Management Corp.16 9 In Bevill, trustees of two
related corporate entities in bankruptcy and receivership sought disclo-
sure of communications between officers of both entities and a team of
lawyers.1 70 The trustees waived any attorney-client privilege on behalf
of the entities"' and sought the disclosure in a bankruptcy and a receiv-
ership proceeding and also as part of an SEC criminal investigation into
possible fraud.172
Client and Lawyer confer in Client's office about a legal matter. Client realizes that
occupants of nearby offices can normally hear the sound of voices coming from
Client's office but reasonably supposes they cannot intelligibly detect individual
words. An occupant of an adjoining office secretly records the conference between
Client and Lawyer and is able to make out the contents of their communications.
Even if it violates no law in the jurisdiction, the secret recording ordinarily would
not be anticipated by persons wishing to confer in confidence. Accordingly, the fact
that the eavesdropper overheard the Client-Lawyer communications does not impair
their confidential status.
§ 71, cmt. c, illus. 1 (2000).
168. 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
169. 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
170. Id. at 122.
171. Id. at 123.
172. Id. at 122.
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The officers claimed that regardless of the entities' waiver of privi-
lege, the individuals had privilege protection based on their own individ-
ual relationships with the lawyers such that their consent was necessary
for disclosure.' 73 In addition, the officers claimed that that even if the
lawyers did not represent the individuals, the individuals consulted with
the lawyers as part of a joint-defense effort with the entities, and thus the
conversations could not be disclosed without their consent. 174
In the communications at issue, the individuals met with the law-
yers and told them that they sought to have the lawyers represent "possi-
bly" one or all of them and also "possibly" one of the entities.17 The
lawyers considered the situation for several days and then stated that
they would represent one of the entities. The lawyers continued to con-
sider representing the individuals. Finally, several days later, the lawyers
told the individuals that they should obtain separate counsel.176
The lower court determined that communications between the indi-
viduals and the lawyers that occurred before the lawyers announced that
they represented the entity were privileged. These communications
could not be disclosed without the consent of the individuals. 77 The
lower court concluded differently with regard to conversations between
the lawyers and the individuals that occurred after the lawyers stated that
they would represent the entity but before they announced that they
would not represent the individuals. The lower court determined that
these communications were not privileged as part of a joint defense or
173. Id. at 123.
174. Id. The officers claimed that they were represented by the lawyers along with one of the
entities. To the extent that this is a claim of joint representation by the lawyers, generally the rule
is that disclosure cannot occur without consent of both parties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (2000); see also supra text at note 8. The privilege does not
apply when the communication is to be disclosed in a proceeding in which the co-clients are
adverse. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75(2) (2000); see also
supra text at note 7. There is an argument that even if the officers had privilege rights, the officers
could not block disclosure of the communications because the co-clients, the entity and the
individuals, were adverse.
If the officers' claim was not of a joint-client representation but of a separate representation,
then the officers' claim of the right to block disclosure would be correct even in a setting in which
the entities and the officers were adverse. See RICE, supra note 6, § 4:30.
In the alternative the officers claimed that they enjoyed a joint-defense privilege even if the
lawyers did not represent them. In a joint-defense setting, all parties must agree to a waiver. As in
the joint-client setting the privilege does not apply when the communication is sought to be
disclosed in a proceeding in which the co-clients are adverse. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(2) (2000); see also supra text at note 7. So, once again there is
an argument that even if the joint-defense privilege applied generally here, the officers could not
block disclosure of the communications because the entity and the individuals were adverse.
175. Bevill, 805 F.2d at at 121-22.
176. Id. at 122.
177. Id. at 123.
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otherwise.17 8
On appeal the Third Circuit approved the test applied by the lower
court.' 79 That test required, for the recognition of individual attorney-
client privilege protection, that an individual in the entity-tripartite situa-
tion prove (1) that the individual approached counsel for the purpose of
seeking legal advice; (2) that the individual was clear with counsel that
he or she sought legal advice in his or her individual capacity; (3) that
the lawyer communicated with the individual in his or her individual
capacity even with the possibility of a conflict of interest on the horizon;
(4) that the communications were confidential; and (5) that the commu-
nications "did not concern matters within the company or the general
affairs of the company."' The Third Circuit acknowledged that the
individual officers may have a personal attorney-client privilege "as to
matters not related to their role as officers of the corporation"' 8 ' but that
"they do not have an attorney-client privilege with regard to communi-
cations made in their role as corporate officials." 8 2 Though both the
individuals and the attorneys stated that the individuals consulted with
the attorneys for the purpose of personal representation, and even though
the attorneys had not stated that they were not representing the individu-
als,' 8 3 neither the lower court nor the Third Circuit accepted this evi-
dence as sufficient evidence that the individuals' communications with
the attorneys were protected by personal attorney-client privilege. The
Third Circuit approvingly noted that the lower court had acknowledged
that the individuals might have a personal privilege with regard to com-
munications "relating to [their] personal liabilities, except insofar as they
were related to their role as corporate officers."' 84 Finally, the Third
Circuit determined that the individuals had not proved that the commu-
nications were part of a joint-defense effort, that the communications
were made in furtherance of that effort, and that the privilege had not
been waived.'
The Bevill court's test and its application in that case render irrele-
vant the reasonable belief of the individuals in a tripartite-entity situation
as to the nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Regardless of the rea-
sonable belief of the individual, if the communications between the indi-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 125.
180. Id. at 123. The lower court in Bevill relied upon the test stated in In re Grand Jury
Investigation, No. 83-30557, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
181. Bevill, 805 F.2d at 125.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 122-23.
184. Id. at 125.
185. Id. at 126.
2010]1 147
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
vidual and the lawyer concerned "matters within the company or the
general affairs of the company,"l86 even if the communication con-
cerned the individual's involvement and personal liability, no individual
privilege can be recognized. Likewise, if the individual was not clear
with counsel that individual representation was desired, no individual
privilege is possible. If the lawyer did not communicate with the indi-
vidual in the individual's personal capacity, no individual privilege is
possible. An individual in an entity-tripartite situation could easily not
satisfy one of these requirements and yet honestly and reasonably
believe that the he or she is in a lawyer-client relationship with the
lawyer.
The rejection of the honest-and-reasonable-belief approach is
apparent in the lower court's determination that communications that
occurred between the attorneys and the individuals before the attorneys
announced that they would represent one of the entities were privileged,
while communications after the attorneys announced that they would
represent the entity were not privileged. One must consider whether
individuals in a tripartite situation, even sophisticated ones, would
understand that the lawyers' decision to represent one of the entities nec-
essarily defeated the possibility that the lawyers also represented them or
might represent them in the future.
Did the Bevill court intend to hold that no individual can have a
reasonable belief that a lawyer who represents the entity could also
represent the individual in the matter? Yet, lawyers often represent both
the entity and an individual officer or director.' Often, lawyers
represent even low-level individuals and the entity employer in matters
such as suits relating to traffic accidents. Lawyers also represent higher-
level individuals when the interests of the entity employer and the indi-
vidual appear to be similar. Courts should take care not to establish a
standard of reasonableness that does not comport with the realities of the
world in which the people being measured by that standard operate.
In addition to the rejection of the honest-and-reasonable-belief
approach, the Bevill test requires the claimant to prove elements not
included within the traditional definition of the attorney-client privilege.
The long-accepted definition of the privilege is that it applies to a com-
munication between an attorney and a client, in confidence, for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, and where that privilege has
186. Id. at 123.
187. In E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1969), the court stated,
"The Court takes judicial notice that it is not uncommon for corporate counsel to represent an




not been waived.' The Bevill test changes this basic definition.
An individual claiming the privilege in the tripartite scenario might
prove that a communication was between an attorney and the individual.
The individual might be able to prove an honest and reasonable belief
that the lawyer represented the individual or might in the future and that
in this context the individual communicated with the lawyer for the pur-
pose of seeking legal advice or assistance. The individual might be able
to prove an honest and reasonable belief that the communication was in
confidence and that the individual had not waived the privilege.
In the typical claim of privilege, courts would find the claimant's
burden had been successfully shouldered. Yet, in the entity-tripartite sit-
uation, the Bevill test would require, at the very least, that the individual
prove the communication "did not concern matters within the company
or the general affairs of the company."' Further, the individual must
prove that he or she made clear to the attorney that personal legal advice
was sought and that the attorney communicated with the individual in
that capacity. These are elements required by Bevill in the tripartite situ-
ation that are not required in other settings. In other settings, for exam-
ple, what the attorney knew or should have known is irrelevant. These
requirements may involve facts that are relevant to an evaluation of
whether the individual's belief that the attorney represented the individ-
ual was reasonable. To state them as additional independent required
elements of proof is different, however.
Since the Bevill approach varies from the usual, one must look to
the justification for the different rule. Without doubt, the Bevill approach
protects the rights of the entity with regard to its privilege. The Bevill
court sought to block infringement on current management's control of
the entity's privilege, particularly since in this matter the entity's deci-
sion was a waiver, a decision to disclose. In the court's view, if an indi-
vidual representative of the entity discusses entity matters with entity
counsel, only the entity has a privilege with regard to those conversa-
tions, and thus only the entity may waive or not waive that privilege.
The court supported its decision by noting that allowing individuals to
assert a personal privilege would allow information to remain
undisclosed.190
The court's interest in promoting disclosure is understandable. This
188. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950);
see supra Section M.A.
189. Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, No. 83-30557, 575 F.
Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
190. Id. at 125 ("To provide a blanket privilege regarding all discussions of corporate matters
on the basis of an assertion of personal privileges by the officers would prevent the trustee from
investigating possible misconduct by the officers and permit the officers to 'use the privilege as a
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interest is in accord with the general policy of the courts to apply the
attorney-client privilege narrowly,"' Yet, the privilege itself causes non-
disclosure and yet it is an accepted creature of the law because its bene-
fits are thought to outweigh the cost of nondisclosure. The joint-client
privilege expands nondisclosure in certain cases as does the joint-
defense or community-of-interest privilege. Yet, these, too, are accepted
facets of the law because a perceived benefit outweighs the injury to the
interest in full disclosure. The point is that the prevention of nondisclo-
sure rationale is of limited value.
The effect of the Bevill approach of recognizing a privilege for the
entity and refusing to consider a privilege for the individual reflects a
valuation of the entity's rights as superior to any privilege rights of the
individual. No matter how reasonable the individual's belief that the
lawyer represents or may represent the individual in the future, there is
no privilege if, for example, the individual consults with the lawyer
about activity "within the company or the general affairs of the com-
pany."1 92 If an individual goes to a lawyer's office and discusses his
involvement in a matter that involves his actions as an individual, that
conversation is protected by the privilege, assuming it satisfies the gen-
eral requirements of the privilege, including the requirement that the
individual honestly and reasonably believe that he is seeking legal
advice or assistance from a person who may become or is the individ-
ual's lawyer. Under Bevill, if that individual has that same conversation
with an attorney whom the individual knows represents the individual's
entity employer, the individual has no privilege, regardless of the rea-
sonableness of the individual's belief about the relationship the individ-
ual has with the lawyer.
The Bevill approach values the privilege rights of the entity over
the individual's rights. The logical reverse of this approach would value
the individual's rights over those of the entity. Both the Bevill approach
and its logical reverse are inappropriate. The entity has no greater right
to the protections of the attorney-client privilege than does the individ-
ual, and the reverse is true as well. Rather, courts should entertain the
possibility that both the individual and the entity may have privilege
protection.
A court applying the Bevill approach must hold that no matter what
the lawyer might say or not say to the individual about the representa-
tion, the individual enjoys no personal privilege if the conversation
shield against the trustee's efforts."' (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985))).
191. See supra Section HI.C.
192. Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123.
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relates to his or her involvement in the entity. This would be true even if
the lawyers told the individual during the conversation that they repre-
sented the individual. This is not a just result. This is not a just result in
light of the ease with which the individual's confusion could be elimi-
nated by forthright explanation by the lawyer. It is not a just result in
light of professional responsibility standards that govern the lawyer's
conduct and encourage, if not demand, forthright explanation of the situ-
ation to the individual.
B. Bevill Progeny
1. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena,1 93 the First Circuit applied the Bevill
approachl94 to a situation in which a lawyer represented an entity that
had waived the privilege."' The lawyer freely admitted that he repre-
sented the individuals in various matters in their personal capacities."'
The lawyer also claimed that in the grand-jury investigation he repre-
sented the entity and the individuals in a "joint defense agreement" situ-
ation."' As a result of this evidence of representation, the court assumed
that the first four Bevill factors were satisfied. 19
The court then turned to the fifth Bevill factor, requiring that for an
individual privilege to be recognized the communications must not con-
cern matters "within the company or the general affairs of the com-
pany." 9 The First Circuit clarified that an individual privilege could be
claimed even when a consultation involved the "general affairs" of the
corporation if the focus of the consultation was with regard to the "'indi-
193. 274 F.3d 563 (1st Cir. 2001).
194. Id. at 571-72.
195. Id. at 567-68.
196. Id. at 571-72.
197. Id. at 568. This court discusses this matter as involving a "joint defense agreement" and
also as a "joint representation." Technically, a joint-defense privilege involves two parties who are
represented by separate counsel who decide to share information and strategy and otherwise work
together. A broader version of this privilege is the common-interest or community-of-interest
privilege. See RICE, supra note 6, § 4:35 (discussing the joint-defense concept and the
community-of-interests concept); see also United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental
Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989).
A joint representation is simply a situation in which two parties are represented by the same
attorney and share strategy and information. The facts before the court suggest a joint
representation, not a joint defense, since the individuals are not claiming to have separate
representation by other attorneys. See RICE, supra note 6, § 4:30 (discussing the joint-client
concept); see also Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 693 (C.D. Cal. 1995); supra text at notes
7-9.
198. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 572.
199. In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1986).
The lower court in Bevill relied upon the test stated in In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-
30557, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
2010] 151
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
vidual officer's personal rights and liabilities."20 The court limited this
position somewhat by stating, "We hold that an individual privilege may
exist in these circumstances only to the extent that communications
made in a corporate officer's personal capacity are separable from those
made in his corporate capacity."20' The court continued that "a corpora-
tion may unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to
any communications made by a corporate officer in his corporate capac-
ity, notwithstanding the existence of an individual attorney-client rela-
tionship between him and the corporation's counsel."20 2 In reviewing the
communications at issue, the court noted that the communications did
"not appear to be distinguishable from discussions between the same
parties in their capacities as corporate officers and corporate counsel,
respectively, anent matters of corporate concern. "203
In response to the argument that the communications were jointly
privileged such that disclosure could not occur without consent of both
the individual involved and the entity, the court refused to recognize any
joint-privilege rights in this entity situation, stating that to hold "other-
wise would open the door to a claim of jointly held privilege in virtually
every corporate communication with counsel." 20 Noting that the indi-
viduals involved in the matter before it were corporate officers who
owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the court simply chose to view
the corporation's rights as superior to the rights of the individuals.205
The First Circuit improved upon the Bevill approach in that it
acknowledged that an individual should have privilege protection even
when the individual talks with the attorney about the entity. The First
Circuit approach limits the individual's rights, however, in that the indi-
vidual has the protection of the privilege only when a communication is
separable from entity communications with the lawyer and concerns
only the rights and liabilities of the individual. As in Bevill, the honest
and reasonable belief of the individual is given short shrift. In addition,
an individual in the entity-tripartite situation has more to prove to obtain
the protection of the attorney-client privilege than does an individual in
other settings. Even if an attorney tells an individual that the attorney
200. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 572 (quoting Intervenor v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Proceedings), 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998)).
201. Id. at 568.
202. Id. at 573.
203. Id. at 572.
204. Id. at 573.
205. Id. In addition, the court noted that even if the court were willing to recognize a jointly
held privilege, such communications can be disclosed when the formerly joint clients become
adverse. The court noted that the situation before the court in which one former co-client wished




represented the individual, and even if the attorney tells the individual
that the communications are privileged, and even if the attorney tells the
individual that the communications cannot be disclosed without the con-
sent of the individual, the individual may have no privilege protection.
A similar case is United States v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-
CIO. 2 0 6 The attorneys involved represented a union election campaign in
an investigation into election irregularities. The attorneys had several
conversations with an employee of the campaign. The attorneys had not
represented the individual in the past and never told the individual that
they represented him individually. The attorneys told the employee that
they represented the campaign and that the conversations were privi-
leged. The lawyers never indicated whose privilege to which they
referred and never indicated who had the power or authority to waive the
privilege. After the conversations a lawyer for the entity called to
explain to the employee that an election investigator wanted to interview
him. The lawyer explained that the individual should obtain his own
counsel.20 7 Very tellingly, the individual was "surprised by the sugges-
tion" and stated that he thought the campaign lawyers represented him
as well. 208 The lawyer then explained that the lawyers represented the
entity and "had never represented [the individual] individually."20 9 The
entity, the campaign, later waived the privilege, and the individual
asserted that he had an individual privilege covering the
conversations.210
In International Brotherhood, the Second Circuit confronted the
individual's claim that his reasonable belief of the situation should deter-
mine whether a personal attorney-client privilege covered the key con-
versations. 2 1 1 The court rejected this path 212 and quoted the Bevill text
approvingly. 213 The court stated that the Bevill approach, and not the
reasonable-belief standard, was the proper method for dealing with the
"competing claims" of the individual and of the entity.2 14
Turning to the facts, the International Brotherhood court noted that
the individual "neither sought nor received legal advice from [the law-
yers] on personal matters" and so did not enjoy a privilege to prevent
206. 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
207. Id. at 212-13.
208. Id. at 212.
209. Id. at 213.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 214.
212. Id. at 216-17.
213. Id. at 215.
214. Id. at 216-17.
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disclosure.2 15 Finally, though noting that the court need not "reach the
question of the reasonableness of [the individual's] belief that he was
being individually represented," the court stated that the evidence sup-
ported "the district court's finding that [the individual] could not reason-
ably have believed that [the lawyers] represented him individually ."2 16
The court so concluded even though the court acknowledged the
inappropriateness of the lawyers' conduct, stating that they violated the
"spirit, if not the letter," of the ethical principles applicable to them.2 17
Specifically, the court noted that the lawyers "did not do all that they
could have done to clarify the conflicts of interest that can and do
develop between organizations and their employees, or to clarify that
[the lawyers] represented the Campaign alone" or "to clarify that they
did not represent [the employee]" until after problematic conversations
had occurred. 2 18 The court then stated that "the arguably less-than-exem-
plary actions" of the lawyers did not "lead us to change our interpreta-
tion of the law of attorney-client privilege." 2 19
The focus on whether the individual made clear to the lawyer that
he sought personal legal advice places the burden for any misconcep-
tions on the individual and not the lawyer. Yet, the lawyer surely has a
more sophisticated and nuanced view of how an employee or other indi-
vidual might misperceive the representation and the applicability and
rights relating to the attorney-client privilege. Even sophisticated players
in the business world commonly misunderstand the lawyer's role and the
implications for the attorney-client privilege. It is odd that the Interna-
tional Brotherhood court places the burden on the individual to clarify
the situation. A lawyer in the tripartite situation should be aware of the
potential for the individual to misunderstand the relationship and the
application of the attorney-client privilege. It is a slight burden to require
the lawyer to clarify so that a reasonable individual would understand
that the lawyer does not represent the individual and that the individual
has no control over whether the conversations will be disclosed later.2 20
215. Id. at 216.
216. Id. at 217. The Second Circuit also concluded that it need not deal with the conclusion of
the lower court that even if the individual had a reasonable belief, the individual waived any




220. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also placed a significant burden on the individual
in the entity-tripartite situation. The court emphasized that when dealing with the entity lawyer, an
employee or other individual must clearly state a desire to obtain individual advice. In Ross v. City
of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005), the former police director of the City of Memphis
sought to defend himself in a section 1983 action by claiming that he enjoyed qualified immunity.
The individual supported his defense with a claim that he acted with the advice of counsel. Id. at
598-99. The question before the court was whether the individual's claim of advice of counsel
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The Tenth Circuit has also followed the teachings of Bevill. In
Intervenor v. United States (In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas),2 2 1 the Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer of a hospital claimed that his individ-
ual attorney-client privilege protected certain conversations he held with
lawyers who also represented the hospital. Thus, he claimed that the
lawyers should not be compelled to testify before the grand jury. The
hospital waived any privilege it had protecting communications.222 The
court noted that a reasonable belief of representation "may be enough to
create an attorney-client relationship, but is not sufficient here to create
a personal attorney-client privilege."2 23 Rather, the Bevill factors must
be satisfied, and the privilege does not apply if "both corporate and indi-
vidual liability were discussed." 224 Fortunately for the President, the
lawyers testified that he sought the advice of the lawyers in an individual
capacity and that they discussed his personal situation confidentially.
The court determined that the President's privilege protected the com-
munications from disclosure.225
In a related case, Intervenor v. United States (In re Grand Jury
Proceedings),2 2 6 the same individual sought to block disclosure of cer-
tain documents. 2 27 The lower court had found that the individual could
not satisfy the Bevill analysis because the documents in question con-
cerned "matters within the company or the general affairs of the com-
waived any privilege, including the City's privilege, that might attach to the key communications.
Id. The court recognized that conversations between individuals and a lawyer for related entity
attorneys are generally viewed as conversations between the entity and the attorney. The court
recognized, however, that an individual can have a privilege in regard to conversations with
corporate counsel. The court stated that an individual privilege would not be recognized unless the
individual "indicate[s] to the lawyer that he seeks advice in his individual capacity." Id. at 605.
The court stated that such a requirement "allows the attorney to gauge whether it would be
appropriate to advise the individual given the attorney's obligations concerning representation of
the corporation." Id. In remanding, the court noted that there was some evidence that the
individual did just that. Id. at 605-06; see also United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th
Cir. 1999) ("Absent an indication that the lawyer should act in a capacity other than that of the
company's lawyer, a corporate officer will not have a privilege."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
Detroit, Mich., Aug. 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("If [the officer] makes it
clear when he is consulting the company lawyer that he personally is consulting the lawyer and
the lawyer sees fit to accept and give communication knowing the possible conflicts that could
arise, he may have a privilege."), affd, 570 F.2d 562, 563 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding that the
individual did not have a personal privilege).
221. 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir. 1998).
222. Id at 657 n.2.
223. Id. at 659.
224. Id.
225. Id. The court then held that the crime-fraud exception applied such that the privilege,
ultimately, did not protect the communications. Id. at 659, 660-61.
226. 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998).
227. Id. at 1039-40.
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pany."22 8 The Tenth Circuit clarified, however, that the last Bevill factor
is satisfied "if the communication between a corporate officer and cor-
porate counsel specifically focuses upon the individual officer's personal
rights and liabilities . . . even though the general subject matter of the
conversation pertains to matters within the general affairs of the com-
pany."229 The individual must discuss with counsel "his or her personal
liability, legal rights, or actions, as distinguished from the corporation's
rights and responsibilities."2 3 0 The individual could not make this proof,
so the court denied the claim of privilege.23'
2. THE LOWER COURTS
The Bevill approach also has influenced the lower courts.232 For
228. Id. at 1041.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1041-42.
231. Id. at 1042.
232. The cases are numerous. In United States ex rel. Magid v. Wilderman, No. 96-CV-4346,
2006 WL 2346426 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2006), the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania faced a claim by an individual that her communications with an investigator
reporting to the employer's lawyer were privileged. Though recognizing the daunting task placed
on the individual claiming privilege protection by so doing, the court applied the five-factored
Bevill analysis. Id. at *4. The court concluded that "it is by no means clear" that the individual
sought personal legal advice and "even less clear that [the lawyer] spoke to [the individual] in her
individual capacity . . . ." Id. at *5. The court pointed out that the investigator stated that he
worked for the lawyer and that the lawyer represented the employer's entity. Finally, the court
noted that the communications all concerned the general affairs of the entity. The court concluded
that at the time of the interviews, "[i]t can not reasonably be argued that [the lawyer] represented
[the individual] . . . ." Id. Thus, the court held that the individual had no privilege protection
relating to the communications. Id. Yet, in a letter sent to the court, the individual stated that "at
the time this complaint was filed I was told I was represented by the practice attorney Arthur
Shuman. I am now being told he does not represent me and I need to obtain my own attorney." Id.
at *2 n.5.
In Applied Technology International, Ltd. v. Goldstein, No. Civ.A.03-848, 2005 WL 318755
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2005), the court applied Bevill and found that the individual, the former President
of the company, did not prove that he had an individual privilege to protect communications with
the attorney who also represented the entity. The attorney stated that he never distinguished
between the entity and the President. Id. at *3. The court concluded that a lack of distinction by
the lawyer resulted in no privilege for the President under the Bevill analysis. Id. The reason for
this finding is that the individual has the burden of proving that the privilege applies. Id. at *4. If
the President can prove only that the situation is ambiguous, then the individual has not
shouldered the Bevill burden.
In Tuttle v. Combined Insurance Co., 222 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Cal. 2004), affd, 225 Fed. App'x
620 (9th Cir. 2007), a lawyer for a corporation claimed that an employee was a client. The lawyer
was defending his conduct in contacting the employee and keeping the employee away from
opposing counsel. The lawyer had been present at the employee's deposition. Id. at 429. The court
used the Bevill factors to decide that the lawyer did not represent the individual. Id.
In Grassmueck v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, P.L.L.C., 213 F.R.D. 567 (W.D. Wash. 2003), an
individual claimed the privilege, though the receiver of the entity had waived it. The court applied
the Bevill factors as clarified by the First Circuit and stated that the individual had no personal
attorney-client privilege because there was no showing that the communications were between the
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example, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
United States v. Stein, 233 embraced Bevill with the modifications made
by the First and Tenth Circuits. 234 The individual in Stein was an
employee of KPMG, a large accounting firm. The individual claimed
that her personal attorney-client privilege protected certain communica-
tions she had with the attorney who represented KPMG, and thus those
communications could not be used against her in an Internal Revenue
person in his individual capacity and the lawyers and "segregable from issues relating to the
corporate entities." Id. at 572.
In United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1995), an entity investigated gifts and
spending on legislators. A Vice President of the entity discussed these matters with the entity's in-
house counsel. The lawyer told the Vice President that he was acting as an attorney for the entity
and that information could be disclosed to the State Ethics Commission. Another attorney told the
individual that they were all a "team" but that interests could eventually conflict. Id. at 296. The
court noted that the individual had a duty to talk with the in-house counsel and that the individual
met with the attorney in that capacity. He was not individually seeking personal legal advice. The
court stated that it "finds that there is no evidence that 1) Sawyer consulted Hancock's lawyers on
a personal basis or 2) Hancock's lawyers agreed to represent him on a personal basis." Id.; see
also MacKenzie-Childs LLC v. MacKenzie-Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)
(quoting the Bevill factors but then noting that International Brotherhood did not clearly adopt
Bevill for the Second Circuit and stating that in the tripartite-entity situation the individual must be
clear with entity counsel that the individual seeks legal advice on personal matters); SEC v. Nicita,
No. 07CV0772 WQH (AJB), 2008 WL 170010, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2008) (applying Bevill's
factors and denying application of the privilege to certain documents); SEC v. Credit Bancorp,
Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 357, 358-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (following Bevill and International
Brotherhood and denying individual privilege where sole shareholder, President, and Chief
Executive Officer claimed that the general counsel for the entity was also representing him as an
individual). See generally MJK Family LLC v. Corporate Eagle Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 676 F. Supp.
2d 584, 594-95 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (finding no attorney-client relationship after using the Bevill
factors to determine the existence or absence of an attorney-client relationship between counsel
for an entity and the principals for purposes of a disqualification motion).
Several cases decided before or at approximately the same time as Bevill reach similar
conclusions. See United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 842-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying
an individual privilege where an entity waived privilege but the Chairman of the Board claimed an
individual privilege, and stating the individual's responsibility to clarify whether a communication
is personal and whether the lawyer has accepted in spite of the potential for conflicts); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Mich., Aug., 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (denying
an individual privilege where an entity waived privilege and stating the individual's responsibility
to clarify whether a communication is personal and whether the lawyer has accepted in spite of the
potential for conflicts); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (illustrating situation where an entity waived the privilege and where an
individual had a privilege but not "as to matters involving the affairs of the [entity], or embracing
his role or activities as an [entity] officer or director").
233. 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
234. The First Circuit clarified that the individual may claim the privilege only if the
communications "regarding individual acts and liabilities are segregable from discussions about
the corporation." In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 573 (1st Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit
clarified that an individual in the entity-tripartite situation can claim the privilege even if the
general subject matter is the general affairs of the entity if the communication specifically
concerns the individual's personal liability. Intervenor v. United Stated (In re Grand Jury
Proceedings), 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Service matter. KPMG had waived its entity privilege.2 3 5 The individual
could not prove that the communications involved her interests alone or
that the communications were segregable as required by the First and
Tenth Circuit precedent.236 As a result, the court did not recognize indi-
vidual privilege protection for the employee.2 37
Interestingly, the Stein court recognized at least one facet of the
unfairness of the Bevill approach. The court noted that individuals in the
entity-tripartite situation are often unaware of the untoward conse-
quences of talking with the lawyer for the entity. The court perceived
that individuals may misapprehend the situation as the result of the
entity's or the attorney's intentional or inadvertent deception, or on the
basis of his or her own mistakes of understanding.238 The court noted
that lawyers could clarify any confusion by telling individuals that the
lawyer represents the entity, not the individual, and that the individual
has no attorney-client privilege with regard to communications with the
lawyer. The court observed, however, that years after the necessity of
such a warning has been made clear, the lawyers involved in the matter
before the court had not given such warnings.2 3 9 The court speculated
that in cases of true deception, perhaps the entity should bear the cost
since the entity has much to gain by that deception.240
C. Courts Using a More Traditional Reasonable-Belief Approach
A few courts have followed a more traditional path in the tripartite-
entity context and have applied a test of individual attorney-client privi-
lege that turns on the reasonable belief of the individual involved. In
Under Seal v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under
Seal),24 1 the Fourth Circuit evaluated the claim of three employees of
AOL Time Warner (AOL). AOL's in-house counsel and outside counsel
had done an investigation of a matter that later became the subject of an
SEC investigation. In the course of the investigation, the lawyers talked
with the three individuals. Later, AOL waived any privilege regarding
the lawyers' communications with the three individuals so that the com-
235. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60.
236. Id. at 465-66.
237. Id. The individual alleged that she had been represented jointly by the lawyer engaged to
represent KPMG in two earlier lawsuits. Id. at 461. The court noted that in both of these
representations the individual was a witness only, not a party. Thus, the prior representations did
not create a reasonable belief of representation when the individual was a party. Id. at 466.
238. Id. at 462.
239. Id. at 460. The individual stated that she did not recall having been told that the lawyers
represented only KPMG or that KPMG could waive any privilege without the individual's
consent.
240. Id. at 462 n.13.
241. 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005).
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munications could be disclosed to the SEC. The employees then claimed
that each one of the three had an individual attorney-client privilege that
protected the communications with the lawyers from disclosure. 242
The Fourth Circuit applied a traditional reasonable-belief test. The
court stated that "the putative client must show that his subjective belief
that an attorney-client relationship existed was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances."24 3 The claims of privilege failed, however, because the
court opined that the individuals could not have believed that the law-
yers represented them. 2 " The lawyers, before interviewing the individu-
als, told them they represented AOL and that the conversations were
privileged. The lawyers also told the individuals that the privilege
belonged to AOL and could be waived by AOL. In addition, the lawyers
told the individuals that they were free to consult with their own lawyers
at any time. The lawyers stated that they could represent the individuals
unless a conflict arose. 245 The lawyers did not state that they represented
the individuals nor did the individuals ask the lawyers to represent
them.246
This case is a good example of how the reasonable-belief approach
properly protects the interests and rights of the individual and at the
same time does not do violence to the interests and rights of the entity.
The analysis does, however, synchronize well with the lawyers' ethical
obligations and provides an approach that is fair to all. These lawyers
behaved forthrightly, and the individuals were not misled. Unlike what
is true with the Bevill approach, with the reasonable-belief approach, the
lawyer rightfully has the burden to act appropriately and clarify the situ-
ation to the people with whom the lawyer deals. The attorney-client
privilege analysis does not subtly encourage or tolerate less than candid
dealings.
Two cases decided without consideration of Bevill are also helpful.
In Wylie v. Marley Co.,247 the former executive vice president sued the
company for breach of his employment agreement. 24 8 The executive
242. Id. at 335-37.
243. Id. at 339.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 336.
246. Id. at 339. The court expressed displeasure at the weakness of the disclosure. The court
stated, "[O]ur opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the watered-down 'Upjohn
warnings' the investigating attorneys gave the appellants." Id. at 340.
One of the individuals also claimed a common-interest privilege. While the individual and
the entity did enter into a common-interest agreement such that the privilege would apply to
communications after the agreement, the conversations at issue occurred before the parties agreed
to pursue a common-interest arrangement. Id. at 340-41. For a discussion of a common-interest
privilege, see text supra at note 8; see also Rice, supra note 6, §§ 4:22, :35.
247. 891 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 1464.
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claimed that the attorney-client privilege applied to a conversation he
had with the entity's General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer.24 9 This
attorney had represented the executive in the negotiation of his employ-
ment agreement,2 50 which was entered into in April of 1981 .25 The con-
versations at issue occurred in December of 1982.252 The lawyer
claimed that his practice was to refrain from giving personal legal advice
to employees. The executive stated, however, that he had conversations
with the lawyer about his employment agreement. He stated that he
asked the lawyer about his rights under the employment contract and
sought legal representation from the lawyer. The executive stated that he
thought that the lawyer was still his lawyer. The lawyer denied that the
executive requested legal advice and told the individual during the con-
versation at issue that he was not able to represent him. The lower court
found that this statement occurred after the key communication.253 The
appellate court determined that the lower court had not abused its discre-
tion in finding that the individual's privilege protected the conversa-
tion.254 The lower court decided that the executive "could have believed
that he could turn to [the lawyer] who negotiated his [employment] con-
tract for the purpose of securing legal advice in the course of their rela-
tionship and in confidence."255 The trial court had also noted that to hold
otherwise would be unfair to the executive, who could have been "con-
fused" by the situation.2 56
In another case, United States v. Keplinger,25 7 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals looked first for a manifestation by the individuals of
intent to seek legal advice from the attorneys who also represented the
entity. The entity had waived its own attorney-client privilege. The court
stated that absent a "relatively clear indication by the potential client to
the attorney that he believed he was being individually represented," no
attorney-client privilege can be found "without some finding that the
potential client's subjective belief is minimally reasonable." 2 58 The court
noted that the individuals "never explicitly sought individual legal
advice, or asked about individual representation"; the lawyers never
"indicated" that a relationship existed; and one lawyer told one of the
249. Id. at 1471.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1465.
252. Id. at 1466-67.
253. Id. at 1472.
254. Id. at 1471-72 & n.6.
255. Id. (quoting the lower court).
256. Id.
257. 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985).
258. Id. at 701.
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individuals that he did not represent him.259 While the court focused on
the conduct of the individuals in not clearly seeking individual represen-
tation, there is no doubt that the court did so upon a backdrop of apply-
ing a reasonable-belief-of-representation analysis.260
VI. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS
The rules of professional conduct that govern lawyer conduct in the
various jurisdictions must inform any consideration of the corporate-tri-
partite situation because these rules guide a lawyer in the appropriate
conduct for the practice of law. Most jurisdictions have professional
conduct rules patterned after the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.2 6 ' These rules establish a path of honesty
and forthrightness for any lawyer dealing with individuals in connection
with the representation of an entity, such as a corporation.
A. Model Rule 1.13(a)
Model Rule 1.13, the rule that specifically deals with representation
of an organization, contains several provisions that are particularly help-
ful. First, Rule 1.13(a) provides that a "lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
259. Id. at 700. The individuals also claimed that the joint-defense doctrine protected the
communications. The court expressed doubt that the entity and the individuals shared an interest.
The court stopped short of analyzing the question, however, because the court opined that the
statements, in any case, were not made in confidence. Thus, no attorney-client privilege applied.
Id. at 701.
260. In fact, in response to the argument that the scope of the attorney-client relationship
"hinges upon the client's belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested
intention to seek professional legal advice," the Keplinger court stated, "we do not quibble with
that statement." Id. at 701 (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978)). See also In re Search Warrant for Law Offices Executed on March
19, 1992, 153 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court recognized that individual principals of a
corporate client had standing to raise issues of attorney-client privilege. The court stated that an
attorney-client relationship existed. "The individuals understood themselves to be subjects of any
possible investigation, along with the corporation itself and the motivation for retaining the law
firm to make the preliminary investigation extended to benefiting them individually, as well as
their corporation." Id. at 59. The court concluded: "It would be slicing the salami unduly fine to
claim that the individuals had no attorney client relationship." Id.
261. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia use a form of the Model Rules. The ABA
first adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, and soon these rules became quite
influential in the states. The Model Rules have been revised over the years, most substantially in
the early 2000s as a result of a comprehensive review by the Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000 Commission). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT preface at ix-x (2009).
For an example of a set of state rules for lawyer professional responsibility almost identical
to the Model Rules, see Legal Info. Inst., Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, AM.
LEGAL. Emics LIBR., http://www.law.comell.edulethics/de/code/index.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2010).
2010] 161
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
authorized constituents."262 This statement is helpful in the tripartite sit-
uation because it clarifies that if an attorney represents the entity, then
the attorney generally represents the entity and not those who speak and
act for the entity. The acts and words of the agents are the acts and
words of the entity for purposes of the attorney-client relationship, if
those acts and words are acts and words of the agent qua agent and not
the individual on his or her own individual behalf. Even lawyers can
sometimes forget that the client is the entity. After all, lawyers deal with
the individuals involved, and those lawyers form relationships with the
individuals. This rule is a clarification and a reminder.
B. Model Rule 1.13(b)
Rule 1.13 continues in part (b) by discussing the lawyer's duty to
an entity client. The rule states that representing the entity involves act-
ing "as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organiza-
tion."263 This makes clear that the entity client has the same position in
an attorney-client relationship as an individual has if a lawyer repre-
sented an individual.
C. Model Rule 1.13(f)
Because the corporate-tripartite situation is inherently confusing to
the individual actors-lawyer and nonlawyer alike-and because this
confusion was obvious to the drafters of the professional responsibility
rules, Rule 1.13(f) further seeks to ameliorate the confusion. Rule
1.13(f) states: "In dealing with an organization's directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall
explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."264 So an attorney who is
investigating a matter for his or her entity client has a duty when talking
with officers, employees, and other such individuals to clarify whom the
lawyer represents. The lawyer has this duty because rarely in the typical
investigation are the interests of the individuals and the interests of the
entity identical. In addition, even individuals who are sophisticated busi-
nesspeople perhaps do not easily understand how the interests of the
entity and the interests of the individuals might diverge. The many cases
discussed in this article certainly make this point perfectly clear not only
with regard to a general divergence but also regarding the particular
divergence that can occur when the entity wishes to disclose information
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.13(a) (2009).
263. Id. R. 1.13(b) (2009).
264. Id. R. 1.13(f) (2009).
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that the individual wants to keep private. Unless the attorney explains to
the individual not only that the lawyer represents the entity but also that
the entity could decide to release the individual's communications with
the lawyer to third parties and even law-enforcement authorities, the
individual may not truly understand the nature and extreme extent of the
possible divergence of interests.
D. Model Rule 1.13(g)
Rule 1.13(g) muddies the concept of representation of the entity a
bit, especially with regard to the tripartite situation. Rule 1.13(g) states
that "[a] lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of
its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other con-
stituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7."265 This rule thus makes
clear that it is possible for a lawyer to represent not only the entity but
also individuals involved with the entity. The rule provides the caveat
that, of course, such a representation should not occur if it violates con-
flict-of-interest principles. Representations of all kinds and in all sorts of
settings occur with conflicts of interest, and these all violate professional
responsibility rules.26 6 Rule 1.13(g) simply clarifies that a corporate-tri-
partite situation can be the basis for a lawyer representing an entity and
an individual or other constituent but that the general approval stated in
Rule 1.13(g) is subject to the multiple representation being without
impermissible conflicts of interest. In the tripartite setting this rule
makes clear that a lawyer can represent both an entity and an individual
as long as no impermissible conflict is created. Thus, a lawyer can, at
least theoretically, do exactly what the individuals in tripartite situations
often claim: that the lawyer representing the entity also represented the
individual.
E. Model Rule 4.3
Another very helpful professional responsibility provision is Rule
4.3, which states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disin-
terested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunder-
standing. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or
265. Id. R. 1.13(g) (2009).
266. See, e.g., id. R. 1.7(a), R. 1.9(a) (2009).
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have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of
the client.2 67
A lawyer in a tripartite situation must take care not to mislead the indi-
vidual as to the lawyer's role. When an entity lawyer knows or, more
likely in many situations, "reasonably should know" that the individual
is confused about the lawyer's role, the lawyer should "make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding." 268 Lawyers must be aware that
in many, many situations, there is confusion.
F. Model Rule 8.4(c)
Finally, the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility demand
that a lawyer avoid dishonest conduct. Rule 8.4 states, in part: "It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."2 69 This rule leaves no
doubt as to its meaning. A lawyer in a tripartite situation cannot act
dishonestly. In other contexts such as contract law, taking advantage of
another's confusion and not correcting that confusion can be treated as
dishonest, deceitful conduct.2 70
VII. CONCLUSION: RESOLVING THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
There is cognitive dissonance in the tripartite situation and in the
treatment the corporate-tripartite situation is receiving in the law and
courts. One dissonance is the actions of lawyers in the tripartite situation
when dealing with individual-entity actors against the backdrop of the
relevant tenets of professional responsibility. A second dissonance is the
treatment courts have given the individuals' claims of privilege when the
context is the tripartite situation against a backdrop of the treatment that
similar claims receive in other contexts.
A lawyer who is employed by an entity and who is investigating a
sensitive matter for the entity must talk with various individuals affili-
ated as officers, directors, employees, or other constituents of the entity.
The governing tenets of professional responsibility provide a backdrop
of honesty and forthrightness on the part of lawyers. A lawyer dealing
with an individual in a corporate-tripartite situation must not be dishon-
est and must not mislead. Such a lawyer must correct the individual's
misapprehensions to the extent the lawyer reasonably should know of
the misapprehensions.
Perhaps the individual with whom the lawyer is dealing is confused
267. Id. R. 4.3 (2009).
268. Id.
269. Id. R. 8.4(c) (2009).
270. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
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about the nature of the representation and the implications that flow
from the nature of the representation. Perhaps the individual does not
understand that the lawyer represents only the entity. Perhaps the indi-
vidual does not understand that his or her statements to the lawyer can
be disclosed over the individual's objection. Even a sophisticated corpo-
rate actor may be confused on these points. Perhaps the sophisticated
corporate actor who deals with counsel for the entity regularly is the
individual who thinks of that lawyer as his or her own counsel. Perhaps
it is this sophisticated corporate actor, not being a lawyer, who does not
fully appreciate the rather esoteric rules of application and waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. The rules of professional responsibility do not
tell lawyers when they reasonably should know of the individual's con-
fusion, but the tenor of the professional responsibility tenets makes clear
that a lawyer in this situation should not mislead or otherwise act dis-
honestly and must, at that hard-to-determine point of reasonable belief,
clarify the confusion of the individual with whom the lawyer deals.
One might expect lawyers dealing with individuals in the entity-
tripartite situation to be exceedingly forthright and clear as to the rights
and roles of the actors. For example, when conducting an investigation
into entity activity, a lawyer could avoid impropriety by clearly stating
to each individual with whom the lawyer communicates that the lawyer
represents the entity, that the lawyer does not represent the individual,
that conversations with the lawyer will be disclosed to the entity, and
that the entity, not the individual, will decide if, when, and to whom the
conversations are to be disclosed. A careful lawyer might provide the
disclosure orally and in a writing that the lawyer requires the individual
to sign. The rules of professional responsibility encourage a clear
Upjohn warning.
But in case after reported case, there is no evidence of a written
disclosure of this sort and often no evidence of even an oral disclosure
or clarification.27 ' Perhaps there are many reasons for this, but three in
particular come to mind.
First, the bite of a violation of professional-conduct rules is not
great. The chance that a lawyer will be reported to discipline authorities
is low, and the chance and magnitude of a punishment are not great.
Second, obfuscating the tripartite situation allows the lawyer to
gain more information for his or her client because the individuals
related to the organization might be more willing to talk. So a lawyer
who wants to do a good job for the entity client might have a tendency
to err on the side of lack of clarity.
271. See supra discussion of United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), at
notes 228-35.
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Third, the treatment the majority of courts have given individual
claims of attorney-client privilege in the corporate-tripartite situation
actually encourages a lack of clarity. These courts-the Third Circuit in
Bevill and courts that have followed Bevill's approach with or without
modification-require an individual claiming a privilege in a corporate-
tripartite setting to make an almost impossible showing for the individ-
ual to succeed.272 These courts erect this great wall in an effort to protect
the entity and perhaps, consciously or unconsciously, the lawyer.27 3 In
so doing these courts have stepped away from traditional attorney-client
privilege law27 4 by imposing a test for application of the attorney-client
privilege that is more onerous than the test used otherwise. The claimant
must prove more.
In addition, these courts, in using this unique approach, reject tradi-
tional concepts with regard to the formation of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The touchstone of the attorney-client relationship is whether
the individual in the position of client honestly and reasonably believes
that the lawyer represents the individual. This touchstone has been used
throughout the law and in particular is a familiar concept with regard to
applying the attorney-client privilege.2 75 If an individual in an entity-
tripartite situation claims an individual attorney-client privilege in these
courts, not only is the proof exceedingly rigorous, but the individual's
honest and reasonable belief of representation and related privilege is
irrelevant. This attorney-client privilege analysis provides the lawyer
laboring in this environment no incentive to be clear as to the lawyer's
role and interest or the interest of the entity as it relates to the individual.
In fact, because the typical court's analysis puts much of the relation-
ship-development burden on the individual, the lawyer has no incentive
to clarify the situation in the face of incentive to maximize information
flow by obfuscation. An individual with an honest and reasonable belief
that the lawyer represents or represented him has no port in the storm;
the individual loses the privilege claim.
This leaves a situation in which professional responsibility rules
teach forthrightness but attorney-client privilege application does not
encourage forthrightness. This approach to applying the attorney-client
privilege may even encourage the attorney to obfuscate when added with
the obvious incentive for the lawyer to do whatever to help the client. A
divergence such as this happens occasionally in the law if there is a
strong rationale for it. In the tripartite situation in which the courts
272. See supra Section V.
273. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REv. 453, 456 (2008) (noting that judges favor lawyers).
274. See supra Section III.
275. See supra Section IV.
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devised a new rule delineating the application of the attorney-client priv-
ilege that is not anchored in tradition and in which the courts rejected the
traditional teachings with regard to the formation of an attorney-client
relationship, there is no strong rationale. The situation is quite the
contrary.
The superior approach in the tripartite situation is to evaluate an
individual's claim of personal privilege by measuring it against the cus-
tomary test for application of the attorney-client privilege. No special
proofs should be required. In addition, the honest-and-reasonable-belief
standard regarding the attorney-client relationship should be used. The
privilege should apply, as stated by Judge Wyzanski long ago in the
United Shoe Machinery276 case, if an individual in a tripartite situation
can prove:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a cli-
ent; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.2 77
In this analysis the honest and reasonable belief of the individual should
be given credence as is done in other areas of the law.
The courts that have developed the Bevill line of precedent with its
special tests of privilege have been concerned about protecting the right
of the entity to control its own privilege unfettered by the claimed rights
of the individual. These courts have stated that in the interest of protect-
ing the entity's rights, and in the interest of disclosure since usually the
question occurs when the entity wishes to waive the privilege, any indi-
vidual rights must be secondary. Contrary to the courts' fear, a return to
traditional legal standards would protect the entity's interests as well as
the individual's interests. A return to traditional law would also
encourage adherence to tenets of professional responsibility and put the
lawyer on stable footing vis-A-vis the entity and the individual.
If an entity lawyer wishes to eliminate any possibility of a claim of
individual privilege, that lawyer need only act in accord with the rules of
professional responsibility and clearly explain to the individual that the
lawyer does not represent the individual, that the entity will be told of
276. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
277. Id. at 358-59.
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the substance of any conversations, that the entity will decide the detail
of disclosure of any of the individual's communications, and that the
interests of the individual and the entity may diverge if on no other issue
than disclosure. A careful lawyer can have a record of this statement.
Then an individual in a corporate-tripartite situation cannot have a rea-
sonable belief that the lawyer represents him or her even if the individ-
ual foolishly has a subjective belief of representation. The lawyer
conducts himself or herself forthrightly, the entity's privilege rights are
protected, and the individual is treated fairly. Harmony prevails.
